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Abstract 
Emotional facial expressions are potent social signals that can change 
people’s feeling states and shape judgments of targets that are unrelated to the 
expressions. Whether they originate from other individuals or advertisements in 
the environment, facial expressions are undoubtedly one of the most prominent 
emotional stimuli. Thus, there is a great need to examine how facial expressions 
can influence potentially consequential judgments and decisions that involve 
uncertain or risky prospects, as such decisions are greatly impacted by emotion.  
The domains of finance and health could particularly benefit from such an 
examination. In the financial domain, expressions of other individuals could shape 
investment behavior. For instance, facial expressions may trigger emotional 
reactions that can focus an individual on either the unwanted consequences or 
benefits of a risky option. In the health domain, individuals’ evaluations of the 
risks and benefits associated with a medical treatment could be guided by the 
emotionality depicted on the face of a doctor. This second domain has particular 
relevance to older individuals due to their greater preference for positively over 
negatively valenced stimuli and the importance of effectively promoting 
preventative health behaviors for older adults.   
Thus, two studies were conducted in order to examine the role of 
emotional facial expressions in judgments and decisions involving risk in the 
financial and health domains. The first study examined whether the posing of 
positive (happiness), negative (fear), and neutral facial expressions could 
influence participants’ affective responding and ultimately their sub-optimal risk-
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taking and risk-avoidant behavior in a financial investment task. In Study 1, the 
facial posing manipulation did not have the intended effect on participants’ 
changes in self-reported valence. Specifically, in the neutral-posing condition, 
participants reported the greatest increase in negative valence and demonstrated 
significantly greater sub-optimal risk aversion in comparison to the fear-posing 
condition. Furthermore, significant relations between participants’ facial 
responding and sub-optimal risk seeking behavior were discovered in the neutral 
posing condition. Specifically, decreased corrugator and increased zygomaticus 
activity in response to affectively neutral expressions in the neutral-posing 
condition was related to increased risk seeking. This relationship between fEMG 
activity and risk seeking was consistent with previously described relations 
between positive and negative affective and risk seeking. Thus, fEMG may be a 
useful tool when attempting to evaluate how individuals’ affective responses to 
stimuli relate to their risk seeking behavior in financial decision tasks.  
The second study explored whether spontaneous facial responses to 
emotional facial expressions presented during an influenza vaccine commercial 
could change participants’ evaluations (behavioral intentions, risk perceptions, 
and integral feelings) regarding the flu vaccine. Importantly, this study included 
older and younger adults to examine whether aging-related increases in the 
preference for positive over negative information could lead to differential 
influences of positive and negative facial expressions on the above-mentioned 
evaluations. Manipulating the facial expressions in the commercial had a 
significant, albeit unpredicted effect on participants’ evaluations. Relative to those 
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who watched the smiling doctors, older and younger adults who watched the 
concerned doctors felt better about the vaccine. Furthermore, older adults who 
watched the smiling doctors reported greater increases in worry about contracting 
the flu in comparison to those who watched the concerned doctors. Overall, 
findings of Study 2 suggest that concerned rather than happy facial expressions 
should accompany messages that are aimed at increasing vaccination behavior. 
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General Introduction 
 Until recent decades, decision-making theorists posited that decisions 
with uncertain outcomes were navigated solely by weighing the probabilities and 
severity of favorable and unfavorable outcomes (e.g., Savage 1954). Such 
accounts were modified through the realization that affective processes influence 
rational calculations of risk in numerous ways (for review see: Lerner, Li, 
Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2014). Importantly, two manifestations of affect can 
influence risk-related decisions and judgments (i.e., subjective assessments of a 
target’s potential for harm or benefit). Integral affect arises in response to one or 
more components of a decision (see e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1996; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Slovic, Peters, & Finucace, 2005). In contrast, 
incidental affect originates from a source that is unrelated to the current task yet 
can infiltrate the decision process (see e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001). Incidental affect can lead to unintended consequences for decision 
makers as it can operate under the radar of one’s awareness to influence their 
perception of probabilistic information (e.g., Caruso & Shafir, 2006; Constans, & 
Mathews, 1993; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992). Given the 
influence of affect on perceived probabilities, judgments and decisions involving 
risk are particularly vulnerable to incidental affect (Chou, Lee, & Ho, 2007; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Wright & Bower, 1992). 
Given the potential for incidental affect to bias some of our most 
consequential decisions, it is paramount to better understand how incidental affect 
can influence our responses to risks when managing our finances and physical 
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health. For instance, an incidental negative state can motivate one to avoid future 
losses, thus promoting a risk-averse strategy. Moreover, in the treatment domain, 
incidental positive affect may divert attention away from information highlighting 
the potential for unwanted outcomes such as side effects. 
Beyond examining how incidental affect guides judgments and decisions 
involving risk, it is also critical to study the most prominent sources of incidental 
affect. One of the most common and ecologically valid sources of incidental 
affect are emotional facial expressions. Few emotional stimuli are as evident in 
everyday circumstances as are emotional facial expressions (Dimberg, Thunberg, 
& Elmehed, 2000; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Given their ubiquity and 
prominence in our social environment, it is surprising that so few studies have 
examined the influence of facial expressions on risk-related evaluations or 
decisions. Converging evidence suggest that facial expressions can create an 
affective context that may be sufficient enough to impact risk-related decision 
making (e.g., Habib, Cassotti, Moutier, Houdé, & Borst, 2015). For instance, 
viewing facial expressions can elicit emotional experiences (Lishner, Cooter, & 
Zald, 2008; Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Muenz, 1994). There is also considerable 
evidence that people automatically mimic observed facial expressions (for 
discussion see: Hess, Philippot, & Blairy, 1999) and experience the corresponding 
affective state through an embodied process called facial feedback (e.g., Cannon 
Hayes & Tipper, 2009; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Moody & McIntosh, 2006). 
Furthermore, emotional facial stimuli can influence evaluations of targets 
unrelated to the expression (Murphy, & Zajonc, 1993; Ottati, Terkildsen, & 
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Hubbard, 1997) and can even influence consumption behavior (Winkielman, 
Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005).  
Based on the converging findings from the multiple research areas that are 
cited above, it is likely that both posed expressions and spontaneous reactions to 
facial stimuli will influence risk-related decision-making in the consequential 
domains of health and finance. To test this prediction, two experiments were 
conducted in order to examine the role of emotional facial expressions in risk-
related judgments and decisions. The first study examined whether modeling 
positive (happiness) or negative (fear) versus neutral facial expressions could 
influence risk-taking and risk-avoidant behavior in a financial investment task. 
The second study examined whether spontaneous facial reactions to emotional 
expressions presented during an influenza vaccine commercial could change 
participants’ evaluations (behavioral intentions, risk perceptions, and integral 
feelings) regarding the flu vaccine. Importantly, this study included older and 
younger adult samples to examine whether age-related preferences for positive 
over negative information would lead to differential influences of positive and 
negative facial expressions on the above-mentioned evaluations. 
Prior to discussing the unique rationale for each study, the following 
sections will review literature that is only relevant to both of the present 
experiments. The review begins by explaining how incidental affect relates to 
risk-related judgments and decisions. Next, the review focuses on the influences 
and measurement of facial expressions in social, emotional, and evaluative 
contexts.  
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Incidental Affect and Risk 
Incidental affect can take the form of mood states (affective states that 
have lingered over from recent experiences), influences from the immediate 
environment, and/or the dispositional affective characteristics of an individual 
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Although incidental affect is unrelated to the present 
choice, it can have consequences for judgments and evaluations. Previous 
theoretical perspectives and empirical studies have outlined several ways that 
moods and other forms of incidental affect can impact the perception and/or 
selection of risky options. Specifically, incidental affect can “color” our 
perceptions and memory, change the process by which decisions are made, and 
alter our goals in a decision environment (for reviews see Winkielman, Knutson, 
Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007). It should be noted that the following two paragraphs 
discuss the effects of incidental affective states on judgments and decisions even 
though such effects are applicable to integral and incidental affect.  
Incidental affect can alter cognitive processes such as the attention to, 
encoding, or retrieval of information. Regarding attention, incidental affect may 
focus an individual on aspects of the environment that correspond with an 
affective state (Weber et al., 2005). According to the Affect Infusion Model 
(AIM), such selective attention is thought to be concordant with a current mood-
state. For instance, positive moods tend to focus attention toward the potential 
benefits and away from the downsides of a risky option (Forgas, 1994, 1995). 
Incidental affect can also influence how memory for information is encoded and 
retrieved (e.g., Bower, 1981, Matthews, Pitcaithly, & Mann, 1995; Watkins, 
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Vache, Verney, & Mathews, 1996), and thus can have consequences in risk taking 
tasks that involve learning or accessing previous knowledge that is necessary to 
ascertain the riskiness of an option. For example, negative incidental affective 
states can trigger affectively-similarly information in memory (Bower, 1981).  
Next, incidental affect can alter how deeply and deliberately decisions are 
processed. Several theorists have argued that the human thought processes are 
guided by the requirements that are demanded by a certain situation (King & 
Hicks, 2009; Schwarz, 2011). People tend to feel good in the absence of threat or 
after attaining a positive outcome. Thus, such positive affective states can signal 
that “all is well” and are not often associated with the need for greater 
deliberation. Alternately, people tend to feel bad in problematic situations that 
require deliberate actions and thus negative affect is often associated with more 
deliberate processing. In summary, incidental positive affect can trigger more 
intuitive processing, whereas incidental negative states may result in a “bottom-
up” processing strategy that involves a systematic attention to detail (King, 
Burton, Hicks, & Drigotas, 2007, King & Hicks, 2009; Schwarz, 2011). Lastly, 
incidental affective states can lead to specific appraisals that inspire action 
tendencies or other motivations that may change one’s goal in a decision scenario 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner, Small, Loewenstein, 2004; Schaller, & Cialdini, 
1990).  
Importantly, incidental affect can be mistaken as integral affect that has 
been elicited by task-relevant characteristics such as choice options or the 
anticipation of an outcome (Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Wilson & 
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Daly, 2004). Such a misattribution is likely, given that incidental affect has been 
shown to impact decision making regardless of one's conscious awareness of it 
during decision process (e.g., Caruso & Shafir, 2006). Once incidental affect is 
mistaken for integral affect, it can influence judgments and decisions in a manner 
that is usually unique to the integral affect.  
Integral affect typically arises as affective evaluations of previous 
experiences with similar task characteristics are incorporated into the decision 
process in order to improve future choices (i.e., the affect as information 
perspective: Schwarz, 2002, 2011). Popular evidence from physiological research 
exemplifies this phenomenon and highlights the function of bodily responses 
during risky decision making. Bechara and colleagues (1996) demonstrated that 
optimal performance in gambling tasks resulted from “somatic markers”, as 
measured by skin conductance responses, elicited prior to the selection of an 
option that previously yielded unfavorable outcomes. Over time, these 
anticipatory integral responses guided individuals with normal brain functioning 
away from unfavorable choices. Furthermore, according to research supporting 
the affect heuristic (e.g., Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & 
Johnson, 2000), positive integral feelings toward decision targets are often 
associated with higher perceived benefits and lower perceived risk. In contrast, 
negative integral feelings toward decision targets result in lower perceived 
benefits and higher risk perceptions.  
 The above section summarizes the primary ways that incidental affect can 
bias our judgments of uncertain prospects and ultimately our decision strategy 
10 
 
when faced with a risky choice. Historically, research on the specific effects of 
incidental affect in risk-related behaviors has examined either the affective 
dimensions of valence and arousal or discrete emotions (e.g., happiness, and fear). 
Thus, the following review of empirical findings on the role of incidental affect in 
risk-related decision making will be organized according to the distinction 
between affective dimensions (valence and arousal) and discrete emotions.  
The role of incidental valence. Circumplex models of affect (Russell, 1980) 
conceptualize affect as consisting of two underlying components: valence 
(positive vs. negative) and arousal (degree of autonomic nervous system 
activation associated with an emotional response). Some researchers propose that 
such an unpacking of affect can lead to a more nuanced understanding of the role 
of affect in risk taking (e.g. Mano, 1992, 1994). Supporting this proposition, 
studies that operationally defined and measured affect in terms of positively and 
negatively valenced states have yielded significant findings. Contrasting the 
effects of negative affect, positive affect (either measured or manipulated) has 
been related to more optimistic expectations for obtaining favorable outcomes 
(e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer et al., 1992). In an early example, Johnson 
and Tversky (1983) presented participants with either tragic or happy newspaper 
articles. Participants exposed to the tragic reports provided higher risk estimates 
for a series of undesirable events (e.g., fires, floods, and causes of death) in 
comparison to participants who saw happy news reports. In a later study, Wright 
and Bower (1992) reported that participants in a positive mood overestimated the 
probability of positive events and underestimated the probability of negative 
11 
 
events. Participants reporting negative mood states overestimated the probability 
of negative events and underestimated the probability of positive events. Few, if 
any, studies have examined the role of incidental valence on actual risk-taking, 
yet some studies have examined how induced mood states influenced hypothetical 
risk-taking. Yuen & Lee (2003) found that participants induced to feel negative 
moods were more conservative in their willingness to take risks than those in a 
positive or neutral mood. Similarly, Chou et al. (2007), induced participants into 
either positive, negative, or neutral mood states and found that both older and 
younger adults were more likely to take hypothetical risks in positive compared to 
the negative moods. 
In summary, the above findings generally support mood-congruent effects of 
incidental affect on risk-related judgments and decision. Generally speaking, 
incidental positive affect states increase the weight given to positive aspects of an 
uncertain situation and thus relate to lower perceptions of risk and an increased 
tendency toward risks. In contrast, negative affect leads to an increased 
consideration of the negative aspects of risky situations, which relates to higher 
perceptions of risk and lower tendencies toward risk taking.  
The role of incidental arousal. The experience of the arousal dimension of 
affect reflects the degree of autonomic nervous system activity and is considered 
the degree of activation that is associated with an affective response. Arousal can 
be measured on a scale that ranges from extreme calm or sleepiness at one pole, to 
intense states such as excitement at the other (Lang et al., 1993; Russell, Weiss, & 
Mendelsohn,1989). In decision making research, incidental arousal has been 
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associated with both risk perception and risk taking (e.g., Ariely & Loewenstein, 
2006; Mano, 1994). Mano (1994) demonstrated that individuals who reported 
experiencing higher levels of arousal were more prone to risky behavior as 
measured by their increased willingness to pay for lottery tickets but lower 
willingness to pay for insurance. Similarly, Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) found 
that incidentally induced states of high arousal were related to an increased 
willingness to participate in risky hypothetical behaviors. Regarding more integral 
influences of arousal, considerable research has measured physiological markers 
of autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate and galvanic skin response) during various 
gambling (Bechara et al., 1997) and investment activities (for review see Lo & 
Repin, 2002). These studies suggest that physiological measures of arousal predict 
adaptive decision strategies that reduce sub-optimal risk taking in order to prevent 
unwanted losses.  
The role of incidental discrete emotions. Purely “dimensional” 
conceptualizations of affective valence have historically been criticized by 
discrete emotion theorists for their inability to discriminate among qualitatively 
different states that are both high in arousal and negative valence (for review see: 
Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007). Lerner & Keltner’s appraisal-
tendency theory (2000) posits that discrete emotions can be similar in valence and 
arousal yet can lead to different judgments and decisions due to the unique 
cognitive/behavioral predispositions or action tendencies that are associated with 
the specific appraisals of discrete emotions. For instance, fear stems from 
appraisals of uncertainty and lower situational control, whereas anger and 
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happiness originate from appraisals of certainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The 
appraisals of uncertainty that are motivated by fearful states increase perceptions 
of risk and lead to risk avoidant behavior. In contrast, the appraisals of certainty 
associated with anger decrease risk perceptions and increase risk-seeking (Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001).  
Across multiple studies, incidental fear and anxiety have been related to 
increased risk estimates and risk-avoidant preferences (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Raghunathan and Pham (1999) induced participants 
into states of anxiety and sadness and found that more anxious states predicted 
increased preferences for low-risk, low-reward options in work-related and 
gambling scenarios. Sad mood states had the opposite effect of anxious states. 
Demonstrating further differentiation between negative emotions and their 
influence on risk evaluations, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that individuals 
induced to feel fear made less optimistic estimates regarding future events. 
Relative to fearful individuals those in angry states had reduced risk estimates and 
demonstrated increased risk seeking in unrelated domains. In a similar study, 
Lerner and colleagues (2003) found that participants who were made to 
experience fear (about terrorism) evaluated unrelated negative outcomes (e.g., 
getting the flu) as more probable in comparison to individuals who were made to 
feel angry. These findings were consistent for both experimentally induced and 
naturally occurring forms of the emotions (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischoff, 
2003).  
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In summary, both dimensional (valence and arousal) and discrete emotion 
conceptualizations of incidental affect can predict risk-related judgments and 
decisions. Future research should thus continue to examine how risk-related 
decision making is influenced by incidental discrete positive and negative 
emotions in addition to general positive and negative affective states. Although 
numerous cues in the environment (even those that are minimally perceptible) can 
influence incidental affective sates (e.g., Niedenthal & Kitayama, 1994; 
Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994), the next section discusses an influential and 
prominent source of incidental affect that has been under examined in decision 
making research.   
Emotional Facial Expressions, Affect, and Subjective Evaluations  
Facial expressions have long been considered to be a potent source of 
affective information and influence. For instance, viewing facial expressions can 
elicit emotional experiences that correspond with the viewed expression (Lishner, 
Cooter, & Zald, 2008; Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Muenz, 1994). There is even some 
evidence to suggest that compared to other types of emotional stimuli, facial 
stimuli are more affectively impactful in terms of their ability to trigger a 
physiological responses associated with core affective systems (Larsen, Norris, & 
Cacioppo, 2003). 
Beyond altering a perceiver’s affective state, the viewing of emotional 
faces has been found to influence unrelated behaviors (Winkielman, Berridge, & 
Wilbarger, 2005), evaluations (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), and processing styles 
(Ottati et al., 1997). Such influences are examined using affective priming 
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paradigms. In such paradigms, facial expressions or other emotional stimuli are 
shown to participants who are then asked to evaluate a target or perform a 
behavior. Even the subliminal presentation of facial expressions has influenced 
various evaluations (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Niedenthal, 1990, Niedenthal & 
Setterlund, 1994) and approach-avoidance behaviors (Winkielman et al., 2005). 
For example, participants exposed to subliminally presented smiles poured and 
drank more of a new beverage, whereas subliminally presented frowns had the 
opposite effect (Winkielman et al., 2005). Importantly, facial expressions seem to 
be unique among affective stimuli in their ability to motivate approach-avoidance 
behaviors (Starr, Gogolushko, & Winkielman, 2008).   
An important question remains as to how emotional facial expressions are 
able to change the way we feel and how we evaluate things in our environment. 
One possible process through which the facial expressions of other individuals 
can impact our own feelings is emotion contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994; 
Parkinson & Simons, 2009). This affective transference can occur when an 
observer automatically mimics the emotional facial expression of another 
individual (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Wallbott, 1991). The 
mimicked movements are then theorized to trigger corresponding feeling states 
via an embodied process outlined by the facial feedback hypothesis (Adelmann, & 
Zajonc, 1989). According to this hypothesis, subtle contractions of muscles in a 
perceivers face change emotional states as the brain receives afferent muscular 
feedback signals from the face.  
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Darwin is credited with formulating the first hypotheses regarding the 
differential influence of positive and negative facial expressions on evaluations 
(Darwin, 1872/2005). Fear and anger were suggested to signal unfavorable 
conditions, whereas expressions of happiness were proposed to signal favorable 
conditions. More recently, researchers have explored how posed facial 
expressions influence various cognitive and affective processes.  
Consistent results support the facial feedback hypothesis, or in other 
words, the proposition that activation of certain facial muscles changes the 
experience of affect or other autonomic system activity (Larsen, Kasimatis, & 
Frey, 1992; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; McIntosh, 1996). When an 
individual’s facial muscle activity is inhibited by cosmetic procedures (i.e., 
BOTOX), they are less influenced by emotional videos in comparison to those 
who received injections of a substance that had no effect on their facial muscles 
(Davis, Senghas, Brandt, & Ochsner, 2010). Furthermore, requiring participants 
to pose facial expressions influences their self-reported affective states in the 
direction corresponding with the posed expression (e.g., Duclos, Laird, Schneider, 
Sexter, Stern, & VanLighten, 1989). Other studies have demonstrated that posing 
or inhibiting emotional facial expressions can alter the perception of emotional 
stimuli as well as judgments of other targets (e.g., Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, 
Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010; Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 
2001; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). For instance, Strack et al., (1988) found 
that participants rated cartoons more favorably when pressing a pencil between 
their teeth (in a manner that formed their mouth into a smile) as opposed to their 
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lips (in a manner that inhibited smiling). These findings are supported by accounts 
of embodied cognition, which suggest that the activation of sensorimotor cortex in 
the brain is imperative for some emotional processes (Nicotra, Critchley, Mathias, 
& Dolan, 2006; Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008) and can impact risk-
related decision making as the brain reacts to signals sent by the body (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994).  
These above-mentioned studies and theoretical perspectives suggest that 
self-posed and incidentally presented facial expressions should be as effective as 
the affective manipulations used in previous research examining the role of affect 
on risk-related decision making. The present investigation will thus attempt to 
bias risk-related judgments and decisions with the use of emotional facial 
expressions. To best examine how facial responses to emotional expressions are 
involved in such biases, it is imperative to have a precise and objective measure 
of facial responding. Therefore, facial electromyography will be used in the 
present research as the measure of facial responding during the affective 
manipulations used in the tasks. The next sections will highlight the utility of 
measuring facial activity in order to assess affective responding in the current 
project. 
Facial electromyography (EMG). Facial EMG is a tool frequently used 
to assess affect via measuring facial muscle movements. Despite the limited use 
of facial EMG in decision making research, the following review will highlight 
the utility of such a measure. Emotion theorists have long posited that facial 
expressions of emotion are evoked spontaneously and automatically and that 
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some facial expressions can be used to interpret internal feeling states (Dimberg 
&  Öhman, 1996; Ekman & Rosenberg 1997; Tomkins, 1962). EMG is a valid 
and reliable indicator of both the observable and unseen movements of facial 
muscles (e.g., Tassinary, Cacioppo, & Geen, 1989). Activations of facial muscles 
have consistently been associated with affective and physiological states (Ekman, 
Davidson & Friesen, 1990; Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, 1983, Rosenberg & 
Ekman, 1994). For example, the corrugator supercilii, the muscle that pulls the 
brow downward and together, is reliably activated when individuals report 
experiencing negative affect. The zygomaticus major is the muscle that pulls the 
mouth corners back and up to form a smile and is commonly associated with 
positive affect (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 
2001; Brown & Schwartz, 1980; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Hess, Banse, & 
Kappas, 1995). These two muscles are also automatically and rapidly elicited by 
emotional stimuli (Dimberg et al., 2000). Furthermore, researchers have 
discovered reliable patterns of responses to the valence of multiple kinds of 
emotional stimuli (e.g., words and faces; Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003). 
Studies using emotional images find that the corrigator supercillii muscle is 
activated in response to unpleasant pictures and inhibited by positive pictures 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 
1993) whereas the reverse pattern was observed for the zygomaticus muscle. 
Larsen, Norris, and Cacioppo (2003) measured fEMG while female participants 
viewed and later provided self-reported affective responses to positively and 
negatively valenced pictures, sounds, and words. Self-reported positive affective 
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responding was positively related to zygomaticus activation.  Researchers have 
even used facial EMG as a measure of affective responses to positively and 
negatively framed radio messages (Bolls, Lang, & Potter, 2001). Importantly, 
there is evidence that corrugator activation might be a better measure of valence 
given the stronger effect of valence on corrugator, in comparison to zygomaticus 
activity (Larsen et al., 2003). This is further corroborated by some 
neurophysiological evidence which suggests that due to the corrugator’s 
relatively sparse representation in the motor cortex (involved in the conscious 
control over display rules), the muscle may even be a more implicit measure of 
emotional valence than the zygomaticus major (Larsen et al., 2003).  
The next sections will introduce specific rationale for examining the 
influence of facial expressions on risk-related behavior. The rationale for Study 1 
justifies examining the influence of posed facial expressions on financial risk-
taking. Subsequently, the rationale for Study 2 provides reasoning justifying the 
examination of how incidentally-presented facial expressions may influence risk-
perceptions and other evaluations of medical treatments.  
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Study 1: The Role of Incidental Positive and Negative Affect on Risky 
Investment Behavior 
Rationale for Study 1 
Given the robust influence of incidental affect on people’s evaluations of 
and responses to uncertain prospects (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001), it is 
imperative to understand how facial expressions, a frequently occurring source of 
emotional influence, can bias our decisions in the consequential domain of 
financial decision making. Recent evidence suggests that the viewing of facial 
expressions can impact gambling behavior (e.g., Habib et al., 2015). Although this 
research suggests that viewing facial expressions is sufficient to create an 
affective context that can influence risk taking, more research is needed to 
examine how the expressions present on one’s own face can influence complex 
decision making involving risk.  
As stated above, multiple studies demonstrate that individuals in incidental 
positive (compared to negative) valenced states viewed their probability of 
obtaining gains more optimistically even when the feeling was unrelated to their 
decision. Alternately, individuals reporting higher levels of incidental negative 
affect overestimated the likelihood of negative outcomes and underestimated the 
likelihood of positive outcomes (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & 
Bower, 1992). Other work has investigated the role of specific discrete emotions 
and their impact on risky decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999). For instance, incidental fearful (versus angry and happy) states 
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resulted in less optimistic estimates regarding future events and greater degrees of 
risk-averse choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
Although facial expressions are common sources of affective influence, 
researchers have only recently began to examine how facial expressions can 
impact risk-related decision making.  Habib, Cassotti and colleagues (2015) found 
that individuals presented with fearful and angry faces responded differently to 
the choice between a sure gain and a risky gamble. When faced with such a 
choice, participants in the fear face condition were less risk taking than those in 
the angry condition. Such findings corroborate the predictions made by the 
appraisal tendency theory regarding the appraisal-driven behaviors associated 
with discrete negative emotions. This study demonstrates that facial expressions 
can serve as a source of incidental affect and bias risk-related decisions. Still, no 
published studies have examined how posing facial expressions on one’s own 
face can influence risk-related evaluations or decisions.  
Evidence supporting the facial feedback hypothesis suggests that posed 
facial expressions reliably induce affective states (Duclos et al., 1989; Larsen et 
al., 1992; Levenson et al., 1990; McIntosh, 1996). Furthermore, the effects of 
facial feedback have been found to be strongest when the facial configurations 
match expressions of basic emotions (Levenson et al., 1990; Soussignan, 2002). 
Moreover, other research has demonstrated that posing emotional facial 
expressions can alter evaluations of unrelated stimuli (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 
2001; Strack et al., 1988). The question remains as to whether emotional facial 
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expressions are capable of influencing more complex behavior such as risk taking 
in the consequential financial domain.  
Present Study 
 The present study examined the effects of a within-subject affective 
manipulation on subsequent risky decision making in an investment task. The 
manipulation required participants to imitate positive (happiness), negative (fear), 
or neutral facial expressions prior to making choices among three options:  two 
high-risk, high-payoff stocks and a safe, yet low-payoff bond. The Behavioral 
Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS) task was chosen for the present 
experiment as the performance of individuals in the task has previously been 
related to real-life measures of assets and debt (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; 
Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen, Yoo, & Knutson, 2010). The BIAS task requires 
participants to repeatedly choose among a good stock, a bad stock, and a bond 
without explicit knowledge of which stock is more optimal. Furthermore, just like 
in the real stock market, participants see how both stocks performed after every 
investment choice. This feedback adds to the ecological validity of the task. In 
addition, the feedback allows participants to adjust their investment strategy based 
on the expected value of each stock. Once the expected value of one stock is 
clearly higher than the other stock, the selection of the low-payoff bond would be 
considered a risk-averse error. Alternately, when the expected values of the stocks 
are equal, the selection of either stock would be considered a risk-taking error 
given that both stocks are equally likely to result in a loss. This task is 
advantageous for examining the role of positive and negative affect on risk 
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seeking as it allows for the examination of both risk-taking and risk-averse 
behavior. 
Importantly, in order to determine the effectiveness of the emotion 
induction manipulations, participants completed an Affect Grid prior to and after 
each emotion induction as a manipulation check. As an additional manipulation 
check, fEMG measures of corrugator and zygomaticus activity were examined 
during the facial imitation procedure to ensure that participants were following 
the directions. 
Based on findings from Lerner and Keltner’s (2000) experiments on the 
role of incidental emotion on risk perception, participants were predicted to be 
less risk-taking and more risk-averse in the fear condition (compared to the happy 
and neutral conditions) as fear is associated with an appraisal of uncertainty and 
desire to mitigate loss. In contrast, participants were predicted to be more risk-
taking in the happy condition (compared to the neutral and negative conditions) as 
happy states are associated with certainty and a tendency to approach risks.  
In addition to serving as manipulation checks, the self-reported and 
physiologically-measured affective variables were also examined in their capacity 
to moderate the effect of the facial posing condition on risky decision making. For 
instance, participants who responded to the positive emotion induction procedure 
with a greater (versus lesser) change in positive valence (either measured via the 
Affect Grid or zygomaticus activity) were expected to more closely behave in the 
manner corresponding to the affective state. Thus in this example, they were 
expected to be more risk taking.  
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Hypotheses 
HI. It was predicted that there would be a main effect of the within-subject 
emotion manipulation on participants’ investment behavior in the BIAS task. 
Specifically, relative to their performance in the negative (fear) and neutral 
conditions, participants were expected to make more risk-taking mistakes and 
fewer risk-averse mistakes in the positive affect (happy) condition. In contrast, 
relative to their performance in the positive (happy) and neutral conditions, 
participants were predicted to make more risk-averse,mistakes and less risk-taking 
mistakes in the negative (fear) condition.  
HII. It was further predicted that the magnitude of participants’ facial 
responses to the stimuli and/or their changes in self-reported affect from before to 
after the stimuli would interact with the facial posing condition in order to 
influence their investment behavior. Specifically, participants who responded to 
the positive emotion induction procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in 
positive valence (either measured via the Affect Grid or zygomaticus activity) 
were expected to demonstrate more risk-taking mistakes and fewer risk-averse 
mistakes. Alternately, participants who responded to the negative emotion 
induction procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in negative valence 
(measured via the Affect Grid and corrugator activity) were expected to 
demonstrate fewer risk-taking mistakes and more risk-averse mistakes
25 
 
Methods 
Sample 
 Forty younger adults were recruited from the DePaul University SONA 
system subject pool and were compensated for their time via course credit. Two 
participants did not complete the entire procedure and the physiological data from 
another two participants was unusable due to technical malfunctions. Data from 
those four participants was excluded from the analyses resulting in a final sample 
of 36 participants (27 female) with an average age of 21.38.  
Measures 
The Affect Grid (Appendix A). The Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & 
Mendelsohn, 1989) was developed based on the Circumplex Model of Affect, 
which aims to represent a person’s current affective state on a two dimensional 
graph with valence on the x-axis (anchored with “unpleasant” on the left and 
“pleasant” on the right) and arousal on the y-axis (anchored with “sleepiness” on 
the bottom and “high arousal” on the top). The Affect Grid instructs participants 
to rate how they are feeling at that present moment by placing a single mark on 
the nine by nine grid, thus allowing them to quickly report their state affect and 
valence with a single response. The participant’s valence score is taken as the 
number of the box that is marked, with the boxes numbered from 1 to 9 along the 
horizontal axis. The arousal score is taken as the number of the box that is 
marked, with the boxes numbered from 1 to 9 along the vertical axis. The Affect 
Grid was previously validated with other measures of state emotion such as the 
PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).   
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Numeracy. Numeracy is the ability to comprehend and work with 
quantitative information (Peters et al., 2006). Previous research has stressed the 
importance of comprehending numeric information in risky decision-making 
(e.g., Peters, 2012). Individuals high in numeracy have demonstrated reduced 
susceptibility to emotionally-driven framing effects (De Martino, Kumaran, 
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Peters et al., 2006). It is therefore a concern that 
numeracy may modulate the effect of an emotion induction procedure. 
Specifically, highly numerate individuals may be resistant to the effects of the 
emotion induction. Numeracy was thus measured using an 11-item measure 
(Lipkus , Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) and included as a covariate in all analyses of 
decision making behavior in order to assess and control for individual differences 
in the ability to comprehend numeric information (see Appendix C).  
Modified Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS) task. The 
present study utilized a modified version of the BIAS task (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2010). The task was modified to include a within-
participant emotion manipulation in order to study the effects of emotion 
induction on risky financial decision-making. The BIAS task is an investment task 
in which participants try to earn as much money as possible. At the beginning of 
the task, participants were informed that the task involves choosing between two 
risky options with variable chances of gaining/losing large amounts of money 
(stocks) and a sure option for gaining small amounts of money (bond). They were 
then informed that over each block of ten trials, there is a clear good and bad 
stock and that they must determine which is which in order to maximize their 
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winnings. After ten trials, the good and bad stocks would be randomly re-
assigned. Participants were further instructed that, on average, the good stock had 
a 50% probability of gaining $10, a 25% probability of neither a gain nor a loss, 
and a 25% probability of losing $10, whereas the bad stock had a 25% probability 
of gaining $10, a 25% probability of neither a gain nor a loss, and a 50% 
probability of losing $10. The outcome of the bond was consistently set at a 100% 
chance of gaining $1. This payoff structure was consistent across all blocks.  
For the purpose of this study, the task was modified to include two 
emotion induction conditions (happiness and fear) and a neutral control condition. 
Participants completed three blocks of 10 trials for each of the three conditions 
(total of 90 trials). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants, yet all three blocks of the same condition occurred one after the other 
in order to maximize the effect of the emotion induction. The participants’ 
earnings were reset after each facial posing condition. Prior to the beginning of 
each block, participants completed the emotion induction task (described below) 
that corresponded to the given condition.  
After the emotion induction procedure, the 10 trials began. At the 
beginning of each trial, participants were first presented with a two-second-long 
anticipation screen displaying the following options from left to right: a stock, a 
bond, and another stock. The following screen presented the word “choose” above 
the three options, during which participants had four seconds to choose which 
asset they would prefer (by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard). 
Once the participant made their decision, there was a brief 2-second wait period 
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that was followed by a 4-second screen displaying their earnings (or losses) for 
that trial in addition to their total earnings for the task. Finally, participants were 
shown the outcomes of each of the three possible assets for that trial for 4 
seconds. This feedback was designed to help participants assess which of the 
stocks was more optimal in the given block.  
Facial-posing emotion induction task. The procedure used to induce 
changes in affective experience was developed for the purpose of this study. Each 
administration of this induction began with a pre-test Affect Grid (Russell et al., 
1989) to establish the participants’ baseline valence and arousal. Next, 
participants were informed that they were going to evaluate the intensity of facial 
expressions and that they should do their best to imitate the expression for the full 
duration that the face was presented. Prior to each face, participants were exposed 
to a blank screen for 10 seconds. This period was used to collect baseline 
physiological measures. After the blank screen, participants were presented with a 
facial expression for 10 seconds. During this period, fEMG measures were 
collected. Next, participants were asked to rate the intensity of the expression on a 
scale of 1 (not at all intense) to 7 (extremely intense) using the number pad on 
their keyboard. Participants then viewed, imitated, and evaluated 10 faces prior to 
completing a post-test Affect Grid measure and beginning a new block of BIAS 
trials. The emotion depicted by the 10 expressions corresponded with the facial 
posing condition that they were currently in. For the happy condition, participants 
were only presented with happy faces. For the fear condition, participants were 
only presented with fearful faces. For the neutral condition, participants were 
29 
 
presented with neutral facial expressions. Each set of ten photographs consisted of 
five male and five female younger adult models presented in a random order. The 
same models were used to display each of the three facial expressions. 
Stimuli. The facial stimuli were taken from the FACES database, which 
contains 2,052 photos of younger and older adult emotional facial expressions 
(Ebner et al., 2010). The photos were created by photographing models as they 
posed prototypic emotional expressions. The validity of the expressions was 
examined with the use of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) in order to 
make sure that the modeled expressions matched the prototypic expression 
configurations (Ekman & Friesen, 1977).  
Physiological measures and apparatus. Two relatively unobtrusive 
physiological measures, fEMG and electrodermal activity (EDA), were collected. 
These measures served as objective measures of affective responses during the 
emotion induction portion of the task. Both facial and electrodermal activity was 
recorded at a sampling rate of 1 kHz with an integrated wireless system and 
software package (Biopac MP150, AcqKnowledge; Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA). 
Facial electromyography (fEMG). fEMG activity served as an objective 
measure of participants’ facial responses (Larsen et al., 2003) during the ten 
seconds prior to and after the initial presentation of the emotional faces in the 
emotion induction task. EMG was measured on the corrugator and zygomaticus 
muscle sites. Pairs of 4 mm Ag/AgCl electrodes were attached to the zygomaticus 
major and corrugator supercillii muscles following the guidelines set forth by 
Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). The raw fEMG waveforms were first high-pass (at 
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400hz), low-pass (at 28hz), and notch filtered (at 60hz to reduce electrical noise) 
and then rectified (transformed into positive numbers), and smoothed with a 
moving average window of 50ms.  
Next, corrugator and zygomaticus muscle activity was processed into 
scores for the analyses. First, to correct outliers, the data was “winsorized” within 
each participant (Tukey, 1977). Each participant’s facial activity during the facial 
posing trial was then divided into twenty 1000ms windows (ten for the baseline 
period prior to the trial and ten during the trial itself). Windows with absolute 
values that were higher than three standard deviations from the mean of a 
participant’s collective muscle activity were replaced with values representing 
three standard deviations from the mean for that participants’ muscle activity. In 
order to calculate a score representing the change in muscle activity from the 
baseline, fEMG activity in each 1000ms window during the posing trial was 
converted into a z-score using the mean and standard deviation of the facial 
muscle activity during all of that subject’s baseline periods. Facial activity z-
scores across the 1000ms windows were then averaged into one score for each of 
the blocks. A positive score indicated that there was more activity during the 
posing trial than the average activity across all of the baseline periods.  
Electrodermal activity. EDA activity was indicative of autonomic nervous 
system activation during the entire task. Such activations are often viewed as 
correlates of affective arousal (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 
2000; Bechara et al., 1994; Lo & Repin, 2002) and can occur in response to 
emotional stressors (e.g., fear stimuli; Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2001). Although 
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physiological arousal was not central to the goals or scope of this present study, 
measures of EDA responses while participants completed the bias task were 
collected for exploratory purposes.  
Procedure 
After participants’ signing of the consent form, fEMG sensors were 
attached to the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii muscle sites. Next, 
EDA electrodes were attached to the anterior tips of the phalanges of the middle 
and ring fingers on participants’ non-dominant hand. After sensor calibration, 
participants began a five-minute rest period during which they relaxed and 
acclimated to the sensors. Next, participants completed the modified BIAS task 
and were informed that they would keep a proportion of their winnings (in order 
to make the task more personally relevant). After the task, participants completed 
a measure of numeracy and a basic demographics questionnaire. The sensors were 
then removed and participants were paid $1 regardless of their performance.  
Analyses and Results 
A total of 36 participants were included in the analyses (see sample 
section above for exclusion criteria). A manipulation check was first conducted in 
order to examine the influence of the facial posing task on participants’ facial 
activity and self-reported affect. Next, the hypotheses were examined using multi 
level regressions.  
Manipulation Check 
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 Prior to testing the main hypotheses, it was important to examine whether 
the facial posing manipulation had the intended effect on participants’ fEMG 
activity and self-reported affect.  
First, separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA’s) were conducted 
in order to determine if there was a difference in corrugator and zygomaticus 
activity across the three facial posing conditions. A main effect of condition was 
found for both corrugator (F(2, 321) = 123.37, p <.001, ηp
2
 =.435) and 
zygomaticus activity (F(2, 321) = 400.85, p < .001 . ηp
2
 =.714).   
 Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that participants had 
significantly higher corrugator activity in the fear (M = 4.00, SD = 3.65) relative 
to the happy (M = -.34, SD = .60, t(215) = 14.64 , p < .001 ) and neutral (M = .38,  
SD = .73, t(215) = 12.25, p < .001 ) posing conditions. Furthermore, corrugator 
activity in the neutral condition (M = .38, SD = .73) was significantly higher 
relative to the happy condition (M = -.34, SD = .60, t(215) = 2.39 , p = .018 ). 
 For zygomaticus activity, pairwise comparisons indicated that participants 
had significantly higher zygomaticus activity in the happy (M = 2.02, SD = .91) 
relative to the fear (M = .34, SD = .45, t(215) = 20.76, p < .001) and neutral 
posing conditions (M = -.18, SD = .18, t(215) =  27.05, p < .001). Furthermore, 
zygomaticus activity in the fear condition (M = .34, SD = .45) was significantly 
higher relative to the neutral condition (M = -.18, SD = .18, t(215) = 6.29, p < 
.001). 
Next, a one-way ANOVA was conducted in order to assess whether the 
posing conditions successfully manipulated self-reported changes in valence. A 
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main effect of condition was found for changes in valence (F(2, 321) = 3.28, p = 
.039, ηp
2
 = .020). Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that participants had 
a significantly greater reduction in valence (i.e., greater negative valence) after the 
posing trials in the neutral condition (M = -.47, SD = 1.24) relative to those in 
both the fear (M = -.07, SD = 1.43, t(215) =  -2.06, p < .001) and happy (M = -.02, 
SD =1.56,  t(215) =  -2.35, p < .001 ) conditions. Changes in valence were not 
significantly different between the happy (M = -.02, SD =1.56) and fearful 
conditions (M = -.07, SD = 1.43, t(215) = .29, p = .774).  
Tests of Main Hypotheses 
To determine the percentage of sub-optimal choices made, participants’ 
choices were compared to a rational investment strategy model used in previous 
BIAS task research (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). The model uses the feedback 
from each stock’s earnings and losses in previous trials (within the same block) to 
calculate the expected value of each stock and thus determine the optimal choice 
for every decision trial. Choices that deviated from the rational strategy model 
were counted as sub-optimal mistakes in one of three ways. Risk-taking mistakes 
were scored when participants selected a stock rather than a bond when it was still 
unclear which stock was optimal. Risk-averse mistakes were scored when 
participants selected a bond when it should have been clear that one of the stocks 
was optimal. Lastly, confusion mistakes were scored when participants selected 
one stock when it was clear that the other one was the optimal choice. Although 
no predictions regarding confusion mistakes were made, these mistakes are 
examined in the analyses for exploratory purposes. These scores were averaged 
34 
 
across each block into scores representing the percentage of each type of mistake 
made in each block of 10 trials. These percentages served as the outcome 
variables in the following analyses.  
To test Hypotheses I and II, multi-level regressions were conducted in 
order to examine whether participants made significantly different percentages of 
sub-optimal decisions across the three facial posing conditions. Additionally, the 
analyses tested whether the participants’ self-reported affect and fEMG activity 
moderated the effect of the emotion expression condition on the percentage of 
each type of sub-optimal mistake. Multi-level regressions (fit using restricted 
maximum likelihood) were used because the data has a multi-level structure, i.e., 
the blocks were nested within subjects. Multi-level analyses such as these have 
notable advantages over repeated measures ANOVAs. Namely, the unit of 
analysis in these multi-level regressions is the block itself, rather than the 
individual (as it would be with a traditional ANOVA). Therefore, this analysis 
controls for the non-independence among the repeated observations across each 
block and each individual.  
Three step regressions were run for each of the three sub-optimal decision 
scores, which served as dependent variables. The first step of each regression 
included the covariates of numeracy (in order to control for participants’ ability to 
work with quantitative information) and a variable representing the order of the 
blocks (in order to control for improved decision making as the blocks 
progressed). The second step included the factor representing the main effect of 
the facial posing condition in order to test HI. The variable representing the 
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posing condition was dummy coded so that the neutral condition would serve as 
the referent group. Lastly, the third step tested HII by including the factors 
representing the three continuous affect variables (self-reported valence, 
corrugator activity, or zygomaticus activity) and the interactions between the 
affect variables and condition. Follow-up post-hoc analyses were used to examine 
if the percentages of sub-optimal mistakes differed across each pair of conditions. 
Significant interactions in the third step were examined by computing simple 
slopes. See Tables 1, 2, and 3 for detailed effects of the predictors at each step of 
the regressions for risk-seeking, risk-averse, and confusion mistakes.    
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Table 1. 
 
Risk-Seeking Mistakes as a Function of the Covariates, Facial Posing Condition, and Affective Responding Variables   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                Step 1              Step 2        Step 3 
             b    SE          t             b     SE          t                b        SE               t 
Intercept 20.24* 8.60 2.35 
 
  20.28* 8.66 2.34 
 
25.21* 9.28 2.71 
Block order -0.64* 0.29 -2.18 
 
-0.64 0.30 -2.17 
 
-0.60* 0.30 -1.97 
Numeracy 1.98 11.74 0.17 
 
1.98 11.74 0.17 
 
4.12 12.46 0.33 
            Fear vs. Neutral Condition 
   
-0.02 1.79 -0.01 
 
 -8.44* -8.44 3.34 
Happy vs. Neutral Condition 
   
-0.09 1.79 -0.05 
 
-7.83 -7.83 4.38 
            Valence Ratings 
        
1.26 1.21 1.04 
Corrugator Activity 
        
 -3.92* 2.04 -1.92 
Zygomaticus Activity 
       
   26.27** 8.55 3.07 
 
    
          Fear vs. Neutral * Valence     
      
-0.79 1.56 -0.51 
Happy vs. Neutral * Valence     
      
-0.75 1.42 -0.53 
Fear vs. Neutral * Corr 
       
  4.40* 2.08 2.12 
Happy vs. Neutral * Corr 
       
4.76 3.25 1.46 
Fear vs. Neutral * Zyg 
       
  -26.67** 9.58 -2.78 
Happy vs. Neutral * Zyg 
       
  -25.59** 8.76 -2.92 
              Wald χ²              .900, p = .630                 4.75, p = .314          19.82, p = .099  
Note. Values are the MLM unstandardized b coefficients (SE in parentheses). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Table 2. 
 
Risk-Averse Mistakes as a Function of the Covariates, Facial Posing Condition, and Affective Responding Variables 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                Step 1              Step 2          Step 3 
           b             SE          t            b SE          t                 b         SE           t 
Intercept 31.19* 9.78 3.19 
 
32.80* 9.82 3.34 
 
  33.54* 10.30 3.26 
Block order              0.23 0.29 0.81 
 
  0.26* 0.29 0.91 
 
0.38 0.30 1.29 
Numeracy            -6.58 13.40 -0.49 
 
 -6.58 13.40 -0.49 
 
-8.71 13.91 -0.63 
            Fear vs. Neutral Condition 
   
-3.86* 1.73 -2.23 
 
-5.19 3.30 -1.57 
Happy vs. Neutral Condition 
   
 -1.39 1.73 -0.80 
 
5.88 4.33 1.36 
            Valence Ratings  
       
-0.28 1.20 -0.23 
Corrugator 
        
-0.16 2.02 -0.08 
Zygomaticus 
       
-0.43 8.45 -0.05 
            Fear vs. Neutral *Valence     
      
-1.98 1.54 -1.28 
Happy vs. Neutral *Valence     
      
-0.25 1.40 -0.18 
Fear vs. Neutral *Corr 
       
0.64 2.05 0.31 
Happy vs. Neutral * Corr 
       
4.89 3.22 1.52 
Fear vs. Neutral * Zyg 
       
-1.49 9.50 -0.16 
Happy vs. Neutral * Zyg 
       
-2.30 8.67 -0.27 
              Wald χ²                 .900, p = .639      6.00, p = .199              17.45, p = .180  
Note. Values are the MLM unstandardized b coefficients (SE in parentheses). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Table 3. 
 
Confusion Mistakes as a Function of the Covariates, Facial Posing Condition, and Affective Responding Variables 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                Step 1            Step 2        Step 3 
          b             SE          t         b           SE          t              b     SE         t 
Intercept            8.15 5.27 1.55 
 
6.98 5.32 1.31 
 
   6.70* 5.62 1.19 
Block order              -0.74** 0.20 -3.62 
 
-0.64* 0.30 -2.17 
 
 -0.64* 0.21 -3.09 
Numeracy            2.98  7.16 0.42 
 
1.98 11.74 0.17 
 
4.13  7.47 0.55 
            Fear vs. Neutral 
   
-0.02 1.79 -0.01 
 
-8.44 3.34 -2.53 
Happy vs. Neutral 
   
-0.09 1.79 -0.05 
 
-7.83 4.38 -1.79 
            Valence Ratings 
       
-0.46 0.81 -0.57 
Corrugator 
        
2.02 1.38 1.47 
Zygomaticus 
       
 11.65* 5.87 1.99 
            Fear vs. Neutral * Valence     
      
0.21 1.06 0.20 
Happy vs. Neutral * Valence     
      
0.71 0.97 0.73 
Fear vs. Neutral * Corr 
       
-2.52 1.40 -1.80 
Happy vs. Neutral * Corr 
       
  -5.43* 2.22 -2.45 
Fear vs. Neutral * Zyg 
       
-14.59* 6.55 -2.23 
Happy vs. Neutral * Zyg 
       
-12.91* 6.01 -2.15 
              Wald χ²       13.25, p = .001     16.58, p = .002          31.90, p = .003 
Note. Values are the MLM unstandardized b coefficients (SE in parentheses). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Step 1: Numeracy and block order on sub-optimal decision making. 
The first step of each regression examined the influence of the covariates, block 
order, and numeracy, on sub-optimal decision making (see step 1 statistics in 
tables 1, 2, and 3). Controlling for the order in which the blocks were presented, 
numeracy had no effect on any type of sub-optimal decision. Regarding the 
influence of the order variable, subjects made fewer risk-seeking mistakes (b = -
.64, t(105) =  -2.18, p =  .03) and confusion mistakes (b = -.74, t(105) = -3.62, p < 
.001) as blocks progressed. No significant effects of block order or numeracy for 
risk-averse mistakes were found and are therefore not described. 
Step 2: Main effects of facial posing condition on sub-optimal decision 
making. The second step in each regression included the main effect of facial 
posing condition with the neutral condition dummy coded as the referent. Thus, 
the unstandardized betas reported for the fear and happy conditions represent the 
changes in the slopes relative to the neutral condition. Table 4 reports the mean 
percentage of each sub-optimal mistake for each condition. As indicated in step 2 
of Table 2,and confirmed using pair-wise comparisons, the percentage of risk 
averse mistakes was lower in the fear-posing condition relative to the neutral 
condition (b = -3.86, t(104) =  -2.23, p =  .03). The percentage of risk-seeking 
mistakes and confusion mistakes did not vary across conditions. As for the 
covariates, subjects made fewer risk-seeking mistakes (b = -.64, t(104) = -2.17, p 
= .03) and confusion mistakes (b = -.75, t(104) =  -3.69, p < .001) as the order of 
the trials progressed. Numeracy had no effect on sub-optimal decision making 
(see step 2 of Tables 1, 2, and 3).  
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Table 4.  
 
Average Percent of Sub-Optimal Decisions by Condition 
_________________________________________________ 
                      
       Risk-Seeking     Risk-Averse      Confusion   
                      Mean (SD)       Mean (SD)       Mean (SD)                 
_________________________________________________ 
Condition 
      
        Fear   18.33    25.65        7.41 
  (20.07)   (22.72)    (13.42) 
 
        Happy   18.43     28.06        6.85 
  (21.62)   (23.30)    (11.97) 
         
        Neutral  18.52    29.44        5.37 
 (22.12)   (23.36)           (9.61) 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
Step 3: Main effects of affective responding (self-reported valence and 
fEMG) and interactions between affective responding and facial posing 
condition on sub-optimal decision making. The third step in each regression 
tested HII by assessing how sub-optimal decisions were influenced by the 
interactions among the fEMG variables and condition as well as by the interaction 
between the degree of self reported valence change and condition. The following 
sections detail the results of the regressions for risk-seeking and confusion 
mistakes. No significant main effects or interactions were observed for risk-averse 
mistakes and are therefore not described (see step 3 of Tables 1, 2, and 3).  
Risk-seeking mistakes. As in previous steps of the regression for this 
outcome variable, the significant effect of the order variable indicates that there 
were lower percentages of risk-seeking mistakes as the blocks progressed (b = -
.06, t(100) = -1.97, p = .05). Significant main effects for the fear vs. neutral 
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condition and both of the fEMG variables were found in the third step of the risk-
seeking regression; however these main effects were not interpretable given the 
presence of significant interactions between the fear vs. neutral condition and 
zygomatic EMG activity variables (see Table 1).  
There was no significant interaction between valence-ratings change 
scores and facial posing condition. Significant interactions between the fear vs. 
neutral condition variable and both fEMG variables were found. In addition the 
results indicated a significant interaction between the happy vs. neutral condition 
and zygomaticus activity. Specifically, the slopes demonstrating the relationship 
between corrugator activity and risk-seeking mistakes were different between the 
fear and neutral conditions (b = 4.40, t(100) = 2.12, p = .034). The slopes 
demonstrating the relationship between zygomaticus activity and risk-seeking 
mistakes in the fear (b = -26.67, t(100) =  -2.78, p = .005) and happy (b = -25.59, 
t(100) =  -2.92, p = .003) conditions were both different from the slopes in the 
neutral condition.  
Follow-up examinations of simple slopes were conducted to examine how 
the influence of both fEMG variables on risk-seeking mistakes differed across 
emotion induction conditions. No effects of EMG activity were found for either 
the fear or happy conditions. In the neutral condition blocks, the percentage of 
risk-seeking mistakes was negatively related to corrugator activity (b =  -3.92, 
t(100) = 2.04, p =  .050) and positively related to zygomaticus activity (b = 26.27, 
t(100) = 3.07, p = .002). Thus, decreased corrugator activation and increased 
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zygomaticus activation related to increased percentages of risk-seeking mistakes 
in the neutral condition. 
Confusion mistakes. A significant effect of the order variable was found, 
indicating that there were lower percentages of confusion mistakes as the blocks 
progressed (b = -.64, t(100) = -3.09, p = .002). A significant main effect of 
zygomaticus activity was found in the third step of this regression, yet this main 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction between condition and 
zygomaticus activity (thus rendering the main effect uninterpretable).   
There was no significant interaction between valence-change and 
condition. Significant two-way interactions among the condition variable and both 
EMG variables were found. Specifically, the slopes representing the relationship 
between corrugator activity and confusion mistakes were different in the happy 
relative to the neutral condition (b = -5.43, t(100) = 2.22, p = .014). The slopes 
demonstrating the relationship between zygomaticus activity and confusion 
mistakes in the fear (b = -14.59, t(100) = -2.23, p = .026) and happy (b = -12.91, 
t(100) = -2.15, p = .032) conditions were both different from the slopes in the 
neutral condition.  
Follow-up examinations of simple slopes were conducted to determine 
how the influence of both fEMG variables on confusion mistakes differed across 
emotion induction conditions. In the neutral condition blocks, the percentage of 
confusion mistakes was positively related to zygomaticus activity (b = 11.65, 
t(100) = 5.87, p = .047 ). Thus, increased zygomaticus activation (in response to 
the faces prior to decisions) in the neutral blocks related to increased percentages 
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of confusion mistakes. For blocks within the happy condition, increased 
corrugator activity was related to decreased confusion mistakes (b = -3.41, t(100) 
= -2.00, p = .046). 
Additional Analyses 
Given the unexpected relationship between fEMG activity and risk-
seeking behavior in the neutral and happy conditions, correlations were conducted 
in order to examine if facial responding was related to changes in valence (as 
measured by the Affect Grid) separately for each condition. In all conditions, self-
reported changes in valence was not significantly correlated to either corrugator 
or zygomaticus activity (all p’s >.05) 
Discussion 
 The current investigation aimed to examine how a facial posing 
manipulation of incidental affect influenced the percentage of sub-optimal 
decision-making errors in an investment task. Furthermore, an additional aim was 
to examine if the extent to which participants were influenced by the manipulation 
(in terms of their facial muscle activity and self-reported affective valence) 
impacted their risk-related decisions differently across conditions.  
Influence of facial posing condition on fEMG activity 
 On average, participants successfully followed the instructions in the 
facial posing task. Specifically, greater corrugator activity was present in the fear 
relative to the happy and neutral conditions and greater zygomaticus activity was 
present in the happy relative to the fearful and neutral conditions.  
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Influence of Facial Posing Condition on Changes in Self-Reported Valence 
The manipulation check indicated that the facial posing manipulation did 
not have the intended effects on participants’ changes in self-reported valence. 
Contrary to expectations, participants in all conditions reported some degree of 
increased negative valence from before to after the facial posing tasks. The 
greatest increase in negative valence was in the neutral condition. These findings 
indicate that the posing task was, to some extent, unpleasant overall and 
especially unpleasant in the neutral condition. Potentially, participants felt more 
negative valence after the neutral condition due to a lower level of engagement 
(or increased boredom from posing and evaluating the neutral stimuli).  
Influence of Facial Posing Condition on Risk-Related Decision Making  
Hypothesis 1 proposed that participants would be make more risk averse 
mistakes in the negative affect (fear-posing) condition relative to the neutral and 
positive affect (happy-posing) conditions. Participants were predicted to make 
more risk-seeking mistakes in the positive affect (happy-posing) relative to the 
negative affect (fear-posing) and neutral-posing conditions.  The results do not 
support these predictions. The percentages of risk-seeking choices were not 
significantly different across the facial posing conditions. Further contrary to the 
predictions, participants demonstrated more sub-optimal risk aversion in the 
neutral condition relative to the negative affect (fear-posing) condition. These 
results are indeed inconsistent with previous findings regarding the influence of 
facial expressions on decision making. Importantly, though, the manipulation 
check analyses revealed that relative to the other conditions, participants 
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experienced significantly greater increases in negative affect in the neutral 
condition. Given that negative affect is related to increased risk aversion mistakes, 
it is not surprising that participants made greater percentages of risk-averse 
mistakes in the neutral condition. 
Moderating Influence of Facial Muscle Activity and Valence Change on 
Risk-related Decision Making Across Facial Posing Conditions 
The second hypothesis proposed that the degree to which participants were 
influenced by the facial posing manipulation would moderate the influence of 
condition on decision making. The influence of the manipulation was measured in 
two different ways: (1) by assessing the degree to which participants activated 
their corrugator and zygomaticus muscles during the facial posing task, and (2) 
by assessing the degree to which their self-reported valence changed from before 
to after the task. It was specifically predicted that participants who responded to 
the positive emotion induction procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in 
positive valence (either measured via the Affect Grid or zygomaticus activity) 
would make more risk-taking mistakes and fewer risk-averse mistakes. 
Furthermore, participants who responded to the negative emotion induction 
procedure with a greater (versus lesser) change in negative valence (measured via 
the Affect Grid and corrugator activity) were predicted to make fewer risk-taking 
mistakes and more risk-averse mistakes. 
Overall, there was no support for the predictions regarding the moderating 
influence of the affective responding variables on the relationship between the 
posing condition and sub-optimal decision making. First, no interactions between 
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the facial posing condition and self-reported changes in valence were found. This 
indicated that the extent to which participants’ self reported affect predicted sub-
optimal decision making did not differ across conditions. The significant 
interactions between the posing condition variable and fEMG variables indicate 
that the influence of facial activity on risk-seeking mistakes and confusion 
mistakes did differ across conditions. Unfortunately, the pattern of results did not 
support the hypotheses. It is possible that this lack of support for the predictions 
was due to the unsuccessful manipulation of incidental affect. The following 
sections discuss the interactions among condition and facial activity on risk-
seeking and confusion mistakes in detail.  
Risk-seeking mistakes. As stated above, risk-seeking mistakes occurred 
when participants selected a risky option when it was not yet clear if a stock had a 
greater expected value than the bond. No relations among EMG activity and risk-
seeking mistakes were found for either the fear or happy conditions. Although 
participants in the neutral condition were instructed to pose neutral facial 
expressions, variability in corrugator and zygomaticus responding to the neutral 
expressions was related to the percentage of risk-seeking mistakes. Specifically, 
in the neutral condition blocks, decreased corrugator activation and increased 
zygomaticus activation (in response to the faces in the neutral blocks) resulted in 
increased percentages of risk-seeking mistakes. Indeed, this pattern of results was 
not predicted. Nonetheless, previous research suggests that if the pattern of facial 
responding to the neutral stimuli was a manifestation or correlate of affective 
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experience, then the associations between facial responding and risk seeking in 
the neutral condition should have been expected.   
Based on previous research, corrugator responding is related with higher 
levels of experienced negative affect (Larsen, et al., 2003), and negative affect is 
related to less risk-seeking behavior (e.g., Habib et al., 2015; Yuen & Lee, 2003). 
Conversely, zygomaticus responding is known to relate to increased experience of 
positive affect (Larsen, et al., 2003), which other research has found to predict 
increased risk-seeking behavior (e.g., Chou et al., 2007). Unfortunately, such an 
explanation cannot be supported by the current data given that neither corrugator 
nor zygomaticus activity were correlated with self-reported changes in valence in 
the neutral condition. On the other hand, it is possible that the variability in 
corrugator and zygomaticus activity in response to neutral stimuli reflected  
unconscious affective experiences that participants were not aware of and thus 
unable to report on the Affect Grid. If this were the case, then the general 
relationship between facial responding and risk seeking in the neutral condition is 
in line with the research mentioned above.  
An alternate explanation is that participants’ facial responses to the neutral 
stimuli reflected an interpretive or evaluative bias that carried over to the decision 
task. Previous work has linked corrugator responding to a negativity bias in the 
evaluation of affectively ambiguous facial stimuli (Neta, Norris, & Whalen, 
2009). The neutral expressions in the present study were also ambiguous in 
valence, thus the pattern of facial responses during the neutral posing task may 
have reflected a similar interpretive bias. For instance, increased corrugator 
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activity in the neutral posing condition could have indicated that a participant was 
evaluating the neutral face more negatively.  
If this were the case, then it is possible that such interpretive biases could 
have also extended to evaluations of the stocks and bonds. For instance, if a 
participant evaluated the neutral faces more negatively, it is possible that they also 
evaluated the ambiguous stocks more negatively and thus avoided them. 
Alternately, if a participant evaluated the neutral faces more positively (as could 
be indicated by increased zygomaticus activity) then they could have also 
evaluated the subsequent ambiguous stocks to be more positive and thus were 
more sub-optimally risk seeking.  
The presence of interactions for risk-seeking mistakes and not for risk-
averse mistakes indicates that facial responses in the neutral condition were 
related to a propensity to incorrectly select risky options over optimal safe options 
and not the propensity to incorrectly choose safe options over more optimal risky 
options. Again following the reason above, which suggests that facial responses 
can represent evaluations of ambiguous stimuli, it can be suggested that facial 
responding would not predict the selection of a non-ambiguous bond. The bond 
was unambiguous in that it had the same rate of return for every trial ($1).  
Confusion mistakes. These types of mistakes occurred when participants 
selected a sub-optimal stock rather than an optimal one. Although no specific 
predictions regarding the interaction of condition and facial activity were made 
for confusion mistakes, an interesting pattern of results emerged. Specifically, 
increased zygomaticus activation in the neutral blocks was related to an increased 
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percentage of confusion mistakes. This suggests that positive affect (as suggested 
by increased zygomaticus activity) may be related to more haphazard and less 
optimal risk-taking in the current investment paradigm. As mentioned above in 
the previous section, the current data cannot support this explanation, as valence 
change was not correlated to fEMG activity in any condition. Alternately, a 
similar explanation can be made for this finding as was provided earlier for the 
relation between zygomaticus activity and risk-seeking mistakes in the neutral 
condition. That is, increased zygomaticus activity in response to the neutral 
stimuli can reflect an overall interpretive bias that would relate to more positive 
evaluations of ambiguous risky stock options.  
Furthermore, in the happy condition, increased corrugator activity was 
related to decreased confusion mistakes. These results can be taken to suggest that 
negative affective facial responding in the happy condition was related to a lower 
likelihood of selecting sub-optimal risky stocks.  Although as previously 
mentioned in this discussion, such an explanation is not supported by the current 
data given the lack of correlation between valence change and fEMG activity in 
the happy condition. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 It is possible that the lack of support for the predictions regarding the 
influence of the facial posing condition on decision making was due to the 
unsuccessful manipulation of incidental affect across all conditions. Future 
research may opt for a task requiring participants to passively view facial 
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expression rather than pose them as such a task has been successful in altering 
risk-seeking behavior in previous research (Habib et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the facial posing task may have been too explicit of a 
manipulation and lacked some degree of ecological validity. For instance, 
individuals are never required to imitate facial expressions prior to making risky 
decisions in real-world settings. Future research examining the role of (incidental) 
affective stimuli on risk-related behavior should strive to integrate the affective 
stimuli with the decision targets in a more cohesive manner. For example, this 
could be achieved by manipulating the facial expressions of individuals in 
commercials then asking viewers to evaluate the risks of the product being 
advertised. Lastly, future research may consider utilizing an independent groups 
design rather than a repeated measures design as such a design would control for 
carry-over effects of the emotion conditions to a better extent than by merely 
counterbalancing the order of conditions in a repeated measures design.  
Conclusion 
 Although the main predictions regarding the influence of the facial posing 
manipulation on risk-related decision making were not supported, significant 
relations between risk-seeking mistakes and fEMG activity were found in the 
neutral condition. These findings suggest that increased corrugator responses to 
neutral facial expressions may predict reduced risk seeking, whereas increased 
zygomaticus activity in response to the same stimuli may predict increased risk 
seeking. These findings begin to shed light on how one’s fEMG responses to 
facial stimuli can predict risk-related decision making. More research is still 
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needed to determine whether the pattern of results in the present study can be 
explained by changes in affective experiences or by interpretive biases that carry 
over onto the decision scenario.  
 52 
Rationale for Study 2: 
 The Role of Incidental Affect in Risk Perception, Feelings, and Behavioral 
Intentions toward the Flu Vaccine in Older and Younger Adults   
Extending from the previous study’s examination of the influence that 
incidental affect has on financial risk taking, Study 2 will examine how incidental 
affect can change risk perceptions, affective judgments, and behavioral intentions 
toward flu vaccinations for younger and older adults. Given that the flu is 
preventable with the use of vaccines (Nichol et al., 1995), it is important to 
address barriers to vaccination that may contribute to the less than ideal rates of 
vaccination for younger and older adults (Nichol, Margolis, Wuorenma, Von 
Sternberg, 1994). One common barrier to vaccination practices for older and 
younger adults is the perceived risk related to vaccines (Bartels, Kelly, & 
Rothman, 2007; Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz & Betsch, 2011; Ferguson & 
Gallagher, 2007; Zimmerman et al., 2003).  
Although previous research has effectively changed treatment-related 
feelings and risk perceptions through the use of message-frame manipulations 
(e.g., McCaul, Johnson, & Rothman, 2002; Rothman, Salovey, Antone, Keough, 
& Martin, 1993), researchers have largely ignored more social media through 
which consumers and patients receive much of their health information. The 
present study attempted to change risk perceptions, feelings, and intentions 
regarding the flu vaccine by inducing incidental affect through the use of an 
affective framing manipulation. The manipulation required participants to watch 
an informational commercial about the flu vaccine. Based on the previously 
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discussed influences of positive and negative valence on judgments and decisions 
involving risk, the commercial depicted doctors who were either displaying facial 
expressions representing positive affect (smiling) or negative affect (furrowing 
their brow in concern). Brow furrowing was achieved by activating the 
corrugator muscle. The corrugator was the only muscle that is activated in the 
display of all negative emotional facial expressions and is not a component of any 
emotionally positive expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1975).    
Based on the research described above, emotional facial expressions 
accompanying medical information in commercials were predicted to modulate 
the influence of the health messages. Specifically, affect elicited from emotional 
expressions accompanying health massages was expected to influence risk and 
benefit perceptions, and shape intentions to vaccinate. Additionally, given the 
age-related shift toward a preference for positive over negative information, the 
positive and negative emotional stimuli were predicted to have differential effects 
for older and younger adults (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Chou et al., 2007).  
As previously described, early research conducted outside of the medical 
domain supports the association between induced incidental affect and risk 
perception. Specifically, incidental positive affect leads to higher subjective 
probabilities of positive outcomes and negative affect leads to higher subjective 
probabilities of negative outcomes (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & 
Bower, 1992). In the domain of vaccines, a positive outcome would involve the 
vaccine working and resulting in no undesired side effects, whereas a negative 
outcome would involve the vaccine not working and/or causing unwanted side 
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effects. Examining the influence of incidental affect on treatment evaluations for 
older and younger adults requires a consideration of age differences in health-
related risk perception, vaccine utilization, and most importantly, emotional 
processes that are relevant for risk-related decision making. 
Research examining age-differences in risk perception across multiple 
domains found that compared to the young, older adults were less likely to take 
risks that could aversely affect their health (Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 
2013). Thus, it may be no surprise that older adults receive influenza vaccinations 
at higher rates than their younger counterparts in order to reduce their risk of 
contracting the flu (Bish, Yardley, Nicoll, & Michie, 2001; Galvani, Reluga, & 
Chapman, 2007). Unfortunately, few psychological studies have examined risk 
perceptions related to the flu or the flu vaccine among older and younger adults. 
Given the higher rates of vaccine utilization among older adults, it is unclear 
whether they perceive the flu to be riskier or whether they perceive the flu vaccine 
to be less risky than it is beneficial. Either way, the findings regarding age 
differences in vaccine utilization stress the importance of controlling for previous 
vaccine usage in any analyses comparing the effects of affective manipulations on 
risk perceptions.  
Moving onto age related changes in affective processes, relative to the 
young, older adults report higher levels of positive state affect and lower levels of 
negative state affect (Carstensen et al., 2011). Such affective changes may lead 
older adults to focus less on information pertaining to the potential for 
unfavorable outcomes and thus perceive lower levels of risk. In addition to age-
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related changes in the everyday experience of emotion, an age-related preference 
for positive over negative information, “the positivity effect,” has been observed 
in numerous studies examining processes ranging from attention and memory to 
decision making (for reviews see Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Reed, Chan, & 
Mikels, 2014). For example, with the use of eye-tracking methodologies, older 
adults (relative to younger adults) demonstrated an increased attentional 
preference towards positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli (Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006). Compared to younger adults, older adults 
also attend to and recall more positive compared to negative information in 
decision tasks (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007; Mather, Knight, & McCaffrey, 
2005).  
Considering the affect as information and affect heuristic models 
described above, the positivity effect could lead older adults to accept possible 
risks related to vaccination itself (e.g., side effects and potential complications) 
due to a reduced focus on negative information in favor of positive information 
(e.g., the probability of preventing the contraction of influenza). Moreover, it is 
important to consider research indicating that older adults are impacted by 
emotion induction procedures differently than are younger adults (Chou et al., 
2007; Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009). For instance, relative to younger adults, older 
adults reported more positive moods after positive emotion inductions and less 
negative moods after negative emotion induction (Chou et al., 2007). Based on 
these findings, the emotional facial stimuli present in the flu commercials was 
predicted to differentially impact older and younger adults.  
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Present Study 
The present study utilized fEMG to measure facial responses to an 
incidental affect manipulation consisting of a commercial of doctors posing either 
positive (smiling) or negative (concerned brow furrowing) facial expressions 
while a recorded audio message presented a mixed-frame health message 
regarding influenza and vaccination. The goal of this manipulation was to change 
participant’s evaluations of the flu and the flu vaccine. Specifically, the smiling-
doctor commercial was predicted to make participants evaluate the vaccine as 
more beneficial and less risky in comparison to the concerned-doctor commercial. 
In conjunction with self-reported affect and discrete emotion measures, the fEMG 
measures allowed for the examination of whether affective responses to the 
commercials moderated the effect of the affect manipulation on changes in 
evaluations related to the flu and vaccinations. To be clear, it was not explicitly 
predicted that either physiologically measured or self-reported affect would fully 
explain, or in other words fully mediate, the relationship between the condition 
and changes in evaluations toward the vaccination. Rather, it was hypothesized 
that greater changes in self-reported feelings and/or affective facial activity, 
which correspond to the valence of the commercial condition, would yield greater 
changes in vaccine-related evaluations.   
Regarding age effects, research indicates that older adults are impacted by 
emotion induction procedures differently than are younger adults (Chou et al., 
2007). Thus, an age by condition interaction was predicted in which older (versus 
younger) adults would have more positive attitude change toward the flu vaccine 
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in the positive condition and less negative attitude change toward the vaccine in 
the negative condition. Evidence suggests that older and younger adults show 
similar patterns of facial mimicry (Bailey, Henry, & Nangle, 2009), thus the 
relationship between facial responses and attitude change could be compared 
between older and younger adults. 
Hypothesis I: There would be a main effect of condition on participants’ changes 
in affective states. Affective states were measured by fEMG responses to the 
stimuli, as well as by changes in self-reported valence, arousal, and discrete 
emotions from before to after the commercial stimuli. Participants in the smiling-
doctor condition were expected to report more positive change in valence and 
positive discrete emotions (joy and amusement) and less negative change in 
valence and discrete negative emotions (fear and sadness) compared to those in 
the concerned-doctor condition. No predictions were made regarding the 
influence of the facial expression manipulation on changes in self-reported 
measures of arousal. For the fEMG measures of affective responding, it was 
predicted that the smiling-doctor condition would elicit more zygomaticus activity 
and less corrugator activity than the concerned-doctor condition.  
Hypothesis II: There would be an interaction between participants’ age-group 
and expression condition on participants’ changes in affective states. Compared to 
younger adults, older adults were expected report more positive change in valence 
and positive discrete emotions in the smiling-doctor condition and were expected 
to report less negative change in valence and negative discrete emotions in the 
concerned-doctor condition. This was based on findings from Chou et al. (2007), 
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and Larcom and Issacowitz (2009), which indicate that older and younger adults 
respond differently to emotion inductions.  
Hypothesis III: There would be a main effect of condition on changes in 
evaluations of the flu and the flu vaccine. Changes in flu and flu vaccine 
evaluations were assessed by the differences between the pre and post measures 
of participants’ self-reported feelings, risk and benefit evaluations, and behavioral 
intentions. Each of the following hypotheses predicted relationships among 
variables that would occur after the following covariates were controlled for: 
experience with the flu, initial procedural risk perception (likelihood of side 
effects) and initial integral feelings toward the flu (worry) all taken from the pre-
test measures.  
     III(a): In regards to feelings toward the flu itself, compared to those in the 
positive smile condition, participants in the negative concerned-doctor condition 
were expected to report a greater increase in how worried they were about getting 
the flu.  
 III(b): Regarding evaluations of the vaccination, participants in the smile 
condition were expected to feel that the vaccine would be more beneficial (reduce 
their perceived chances of getting the flu) and less risky (lower their perceived 
chance of experiencing negative side effects).  
 III(c): Participants in the smiling-doctor condition were expected to report 
more positive feelings toward the vaccine itself in comparison to those in the 
concerned-doctor condition.  
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 III(d): Lastly, participants in the smile versus concerned-doctor condition were 
expected to report a greater increase in their likelihood of getting the flu vaccine 
in the next coming flu season, recommending the vaccine to their family and 
friends, and would be willing to pay more for the flu vaccine.  
Hypothesis IV: There would be an interaction between age group and condition 
on changes in evaluations toward the flu and the flu vaccine. Compared to their 
younger counterparts, older adults were expected to have greater positive change 
in evaluations toward the flu and the flu vaccine in the smiling-doctor condition 
and less negative changes in evaluations of the flu in the concerned-doctor 
condition. This hypothesis was an extension from the predictions made by 
Hypotheses II and III. For instance, if the older adult group felt more positively 
after the smiling-doctor commercial (compared to the younger group), they 
should also have a greater change in positive evaluations. 
Hypothesis V: Participants’ affective responses (both self-reported and 
physiologically-measured) to the commercial were expected to moderate the 
effect of the condition on changes in evaluations toward the flu and flu vaccines. 
Participants in the smiling-doctor condition who either reported a greater versus 
lower positive change in valence, happiness, or contentment, or those who had 
higher versus lower rates of zygomaticus activity in response to the commercial 
would report a more positive change in evaluations toward the vaccines. 
Alternately, participants in the concerned-doctor condition who either reported a 
greater versus lower negative change in valence, sadness, or fear, or those who 
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had higher versus lower rates of corrugator activity in response to the commercial 
would report a more negative change in evaluations toward the vaccines. 
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Methods 
Sample 
Forty older and forty younger adults were recruited for the study. Younger 
adults were recruited from the SONA system subject pool and were compensated 
for their time via course credit. Older adults were recruited from local senior 
centers and the Buehler Center on Aging, Health, & Society (BCAHS) subject 
pool made accessible to the host lab by the Feinberg School of Medicine of 
Northwestern University. Older adults were compensated $30 for their 
participation in a larger study, which includes this present experiment.  
Measures and Stimuli 
Audiovisual stimuli. To create the stimuli, videos of three actors dressed 
as doctors were obtained from the image and video archive website Pond5.com. 
Depending on their condition, participants either watched a video of three doctors 
smiling or a video of the same doctors looking concerned. Both videos contained 
three 16-second segments (one for each actor). The video segments were edited so 
that the doctors in the smiling-doctor commercial only displayed zygomaticus 
muscle activity (FACS AUs: 12 +/- 25) and cheek raises (AU 6) throughout the 
entire duration of the segments. The concerned-doctor (negative) video segments 
were edited so that the doctors only displayed corrugator activity (AU 4) (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1977) throughout the entire duration of the segments. In all video 
segments, the gaze of the doctors is focused on the viewer of the commercial. A 
message attempting to persuade the viewer to get the flu vaccine in the next flu 
season accompanied the video. The message was an audio recording read by a 
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male voice actor and was created using information taken from the Centers for 
Disease Control (cdc.gov, retrieved April 2014) regarding the flu and the flu 
vaccine. The message included statements regarding the flu itself, the benefits of 
the vaccine, and the procedural risks related to the vaccine (see Appendix). The 
commercial was presented on a computer screen with the audio playing through 
desktop computer speakers. The videos in both conditions were accompanied by 
the same audio message.  
Self-reported affect. Two measures of self-reported affect were 
administered prior to and after the presentation of the commercial. The degree to 
which participants’ affect changed between the pre and post measures served as a 
manipulation check in addition to a moderating variable in the analysis.  
The Affect Grid (Appendix A). Similar to Study 1, the Affect Grid was 
used to measure valence and arousal.  
The mDES (Appendix B). This measure was selected in order to assess 
self-reported changes in the experience of discrete emotions from before to after 
the commercial. The original mDES measure evaluates emotions experienced in 
the last 24hrs (Fredrickson et al., 2003). The current study utilized a modified 
version if the measure designed to measure state affect. The questionnaire 
informed participants that “in any given circumstance, people often have a 
number of different feelings” then instructed them to indicate the extent to which 
they presently felt 19 different emotions on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 
(extremely).  The present investigation only examined the discrete emotions that 
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were presumed to change as a function of age group and condition; joy, 
amusement, fear, and sadness.  
Physiological measures of affect and apparatus. Corrugator activity, 
zygomatic activity, and Electrodermal Activity (EDA) was collected during a one-
minute baseline period prior to the flu commercial and during the commercial 
itself. This study used same equipment and procedure to measure and process 
fEMG as Study 1 with one notable difference. The waveforms containing the 
facial activity were averaged into twenty, five-second windows (ten windows 
during the baseline period before the presentation of the commercial and ten 
windows during the presentation of the commercial). As in Study 1, EDA was 
collected for exploratory purposes. 
Evaluations of and experience with the flu and flu vaccinations 
(Appendix C). Measures of participants’ feelings, risk/benefit evaluations, and 
behavioral intentions regarding flu vaccinations were assessed prior to the 
experimental session and after the commercial. The difference between the pre 
and post evaluations served as the dependent variables in this study. Questions 
regarding participants’ experience with the flu and the flu vaccine were 
administered in order to serve as control variables in the analyses.  
Feeling of worry toward the flu itself were assessed with a single item. 
“How worried are you about getting the flu?” Participants responded on a seven 
point, Likert-type scale that ranged from 0 (not at all worried) to 6 (extremely 
worried) with 3 (moderately worried) at the midpoint.  
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Feeling toward flu vaccines were assessed with a single item: “How do 
you feel about the flu vaccine?” Participants responded on a seven point, bi-polar 
Likert-type scale that ranged from -3 (extremely negative) to +3 (extremely 
positive) with 0 (neither negative nor positive) at the midpoint.  
Perceived benefits of the flu vaccine were assessed by calculating the 
difference between participants’ responses on two items: “How likely are you to 
get the flu if you do not get the flu vaccine” and “How likely are you to get the flu 
if you do get the flu vaccine?” Participants responded to each item on an eleven-
point scale that ranged from “0% chance” to “100% chance” in 10% increments. 
Each participant’s response to the second item were subtracted from their 
response to the first item in order to measure how beneficial they thought the flu 
vaccine was.  
Perceived procedural risk of the flu vaccine was assessed with one item: 
“If you do get the flu vaccine, how likely are you to experience side effects 
related to the vaccine itself?” Participants responded to this item on an eleven-
point scale that ranged from “0% chance” to “100% chance” in 10% increments. 
Importantly, this item was used both as a dependent measure (by subtracting the 
pre from the post measure of risk) and as a covariate in tests of all hypotheses 
given the previous finding that perceived risk mediates the effect of frame on 
vaccination behaviors (e.g., Ferguson & Gallagher, 2007).   
A Risk/benefit score was created in order to reduce the number of 
outcome variables and analyses. This score was computed for each participant by 
subtracting the score representing perceived vaccine-related risk from the score 
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representing perceived vaccine-related benefits. Positive scores indicated the 
participant perceived the vaccines to be more beneficial than risky.  
Behavioral intentions regarding the flu vaccine were measured with 
three questions in order to consider multiple types of intentions. The first item that 
assessed intentions was: “How likely are you to get the flu vaccine in the 
following flu season?” Participants responded to this item on a seven point Likert-
type scale that ranged from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely). The next 
item, “How much are you willing to pay for the vaccine?” was answered on a nine 
point scale that ranged from $0 to $40 in five dollar increments. The third item, 
“How likely are you to recommend the flu vaccine to a friend or family member?” 
was assessed on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 
(extremely likely).  Participants’ responses to these items was then transformed 
into z-scores and averaged into one single intention score. 
Experience with the flu and the flu vaccine: Four questions were used as 
covariate measures in the analyses in order prevent previous experience with the 
flu from obscuring the effects of the manipulation. Furthermore, these covariates 
helped to ensure that any difference found between the groups was not actually 
due to group differences in flu-related experiences. “Have you had the flu in the 
past year?”; “Did you get a flu vaccine this past flu season?”; and “Did a doctor 
recommend that you get the vaccine?” were each responded to with either a yes or 
a no. Lastly, “How often have you received the flu vaccine in the last 3 years?” 
was responded to with a number ranging from zero to three. The rationale for 
including these questions stems from studies which found that factors such as 
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doctor recommendations and previous vaccine usage explained the majority of 
variance in vaccine evaluations and acceptance (for reviews see: Chapman & 
Coups, 1999, Zimmerman, Santibanez, & Fine, 2003). 
Procedure 
 Prior to arriving at the lab session, participants completed the pre-test 
questions that included all of the questions related to participant’s evaluations of 
and experience with the flu and flu vaccinations. Older adult participants were 
administered the pre-test questions over the phone (with some additional 
questions added in order to distract from the nature of the survey), whereas 
younger adults completed the questions in an online survey format (in addition to 
the other questionnaires in the DePaul SONA pre-screen study).  
 Upon arrival to the lab session, participants first signed consent forms 
prior to being fitted with the EMG and EDA sensors. The experimenter used the 
same procedure described in study 1 to attach the sensors to participants.   
 Participants were then instructed by the researcher to attend to the 
computer screen for instructions. The participants were first instructed to relax for 
a fine minute period. After the relaxation period, participants were asked to 
complete the first Affect Grid, followed by the first mDES measure. They ere 
then informed that the task was beginning. Participants were then instructed that 
they would first see a blank screen for 50 seconds, then a brief (.5 second) 
crosshair in the center of the screen followed by a short video. Participants were 
randomly assigned into either the smiling or concerned commercial condition and 
were subsequently presented with the commercial on the computer screen. After 
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watching the commercial, participants completed the second Affect Grid and 
mDES. Next, participants completed the posttest measures of their evaluations of 
the flu and the flu vaccine.  
Analyses and Results 
Differences in self-reported affect across age groups and conditions. In 
order to test Hypotheses I and II, a series of 2 (commercial condition: smiling vs. 
concerned doctor) x 2 (age group) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to 
compare differences in measures of affect across age groups (older versus 
younger adults) and conditions (concerned doctor versus smiling doctor). 
Insufficient inter-variable correlations were present within or across the categories 
of the affective responding variables (i.e., fEMG, valence/arousal, and discrete 
emotions) to justify MANOVA analyses. Thus, separate 2-way (age x condition) 
ANOVAs were run for each of the eight following outcome variables: corrugator 
activity, zygomaticus activity, change in self-reported valence (from the affect 
grid), change in self-reported arousal (from the affect grids), joy, amusement, 
fear, and sadness (from the mDES measures). Follow up one-way ANOVAs 
estimated the simple main effects of age and condition when a significant 
interaction between age and condition was found. Table 5 presents the means and 
standard deviations of each affective responding variable as a function of age 
group and commercial condition (smiling vs. concerned doctor). Complete 
statistics for the two ANOVAs examining the EMG data (corrugator and 
zygomaticus) are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 5.  
Means and Standard Deviations for Affective Responding Variables by Condition 
and Age Group 
  Corr     Zygo    Valen     Arou       Joy      Amus  Fear  Sad 
 
Concerned 
doctor  
    Young M 2.13 0.67 -0.30 0.35 -0.25 -0.54 0.00 -0.13 
 
SD (3.98) (1.77) (1.89) (2.59) (1.51) (1.28) (0.93) (0.61) 
              Older M 3.77 -0.22 0.00 0.10 -0.20 0.25 0.05 0.00 
 
SD (1.30) (0.78) (1.65) (2.49) (0.95) (0.72) (0.51) (0.65) 
Smiling 
doctor 
              Young M 1.69 0.99 -0.09 0.57 -0.13 0.30 -0.13 -0.09 
 
SD (3.22) (2.34) (0.79) (1.73) (0.76) (0.88) (0.55) (0.51) 
               Older M 0.97 0.15 -0.05 0.00 -0.33 0.29 -0.10 -0.05 
 
SD (3.56) (1.76) (0.97) (2.14) (0.97) (0.72) (0.30) (0.50) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Analysis of fEMG Measures  
No significant main effects or interactions involving the condition or age 
group variables were found on corrugator activity (see Table 2).  Thus, older and 
younger adults in did not produce different intensities of corrugator activity 
across the commercial conditions.  For zygomaticus activity, a significant main 
effect of age group indicated that relative to older adults (M = -.04, SD = 2.05), 
younger adults (M = .83, SD = 2.10) produced more zygomaticus activity across 
both conditions. No other main or interaction effects were significant for 
zygomaticus activity. These findings were inconsistent with Hypotheses I and II.  
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Table 6.  
 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Age Group and Condition on fEMG 
 
       df      F     P                       ηp 
2
           
Corr_avg 
    Condition (1,76) 1.18               0.281 0.014 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 0.09              0.760 0.001 
   
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 0.63              0.430 0.007 
     Zyg_avg 
    Condition (1,76) 0.83             0.365 0.01 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 5.12               0.026* 0.057 
   
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 0.00             0.952 0.000 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Analyses of Affect Grid Measures 
 There were no significant main effects or interactions involving the 
condition or age group variables in the ANOVAs examining participants’ change 
in valence or arousal (see Table 7 for a complete reporting of the statistics).  The 
absence of significant effects was inconsistent with Hypotheses I and II.  
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Table 7.  
 
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Age Group and Condition on Valence and 
Arousal 
 
       df      F     P                   ηp 
2
           
Valence 
    Condition (1,76) 0.08 0.779 0.001 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 0.33 0.570 0.004 
    
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 0.19 0.662 0.002 
     Arousal 
   Condition (1,76) 0.02 0.904 0.000 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 0.70 0.404 0.008 
   
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 0.11 0.744 0.001 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Analyses of mDES Measures 
There were no significant main or interaction effects involving the 
condition or age group variables in the ANOVAs examining participants’ change 
in joy, fear, or sadness (see Table 8 for a report of the complete statistics).  For the 
ANOVA conducted on the variable representing changes in amusement, a main 
effect of age approached significance. This result indicates a trend by which older 
adults (M = .27, SD = .72) across both conditions were more amused after the 
commercial in comparison to younger adults (M = -.12, SD = 1.08).  Additionally, 
a main effect for the commercial condition indicated that participants who 
 71 
watched the smiling doctors (M = .30, SD = .80) were more amused compared to 
those who watched the concerned doctors (M = .23, SD = -1.23).   
Lastly, the ANOVA examining amusement ratings indicated a significant 
age group by commercial condition interaction. To explore this interaction, 
separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of the 
commercial condition on amusement for each age group separately. A significant 
main effect of commercial condition on amusement in the younger adult ANOVA 
indicated that younger adults watching the smiling doctor (M = 0.30, SD =0.88) 
were more amused than those watching the concerned doctor (M = -0.54, SD = 
1.28), F (1, 39) = 6.90, p = 0.012, ηp 
2
 = .133. The main effect of the commercial 
condition on amusement was not significant for older adults (F (1, 39) = .03, p = 
0.874, ηp 
2
 = .001).  
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Table 8.  
ANOVA Results for the Effects of Age Group and Condition on mDES Measures 
                        df                 F              P          ηp 
2
           
Joy 
    Condition (1,76) 0.00 0.977 0.000 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 0.11 0.745 0.001 
   
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 0.29 0.591 0.003 
     Ammusement 
   Condition (1,76) 4.77   0.032* 0.054 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 3.67 0.059 0.042 
   
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 4.03   0.048* 0.046 
     Fear 
   Condition (1,76) 1.05 0.309 0.012 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 0.10 0.753 0.001 
   
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 0.00 0.956 0.000 
     Sadness 
   Condition (1,76) 0.00 0.969 0.000 
    
   AgeGroup (1,76) 0.45 0.503 0.005 
   
   Condition  
     * AgeGroup (1,76) 0.12 0.727 0.001 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Differences in Flu and Flu Vaccine Evaluative Changes Across Conditions 
and Age Groups 
In order to test Hypotheses III and IV, age differences in evaluative 
change regarding the flu vaccine across conditions were examined using an age x 
condition MANCOVA, with three dependent variables representing changes in 
vaccine-related evaluations after watching the commercial (feelings toward the 
vaccine, the risk/benefit score, and the behavioral intentions score). The fourth 
evaluative variable of interest, worry about getting the flu itself, was not included 
in the MANCOVA as it pertained to the flu itself rather than to the vaccine as the 
other outcome measures do. Furthermore, participants’ worry about getting the flu 
was not significantly correlated with the other three dependent variables in the 
model (p’s >.05) and thus was not included in the multivariate analysis among the 
other outcomes which were all significantly correlated (p’s < .05).  The outcome 
variable representing participants’ worry about getting the flu itself was analyzed 
using a separate regression analysis described below. Table 9. provides the 
descriptive statistics for participants’ feelings about the vaccine, risks/benefits 
score, and behavioral intentions toward vaccination organized by age group and 
condition.  
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Table 9. 
Descriptive Statistics for the Changes in Evaluations of the Flu and Flu Vaccine 
by Age Group and Condition 
                      Age Group        Condition              Mean       Std. Deviation 
    Feel about 
vaccine YA Concerned 0.47 (1.42) 
  
Smiling -0.11 (1.76) 
 
OA Concerned 0.74 (1.28) 
  
Smiling 0.00 (1.11) 
Worry  
about flu YA Concerned 0.53 (1.12) 
  
Smiling -0.16 (0.96) 
 
OA Concerned -0.16 (1.77) 
  
Smiling 0.95 (1.49) 
Risk/benefits 
of vaccine YA Concerned -0.03 (0.29) 
  
Smiling -0.01 (0.21) 
 
OA Concerned -0.05 (0.38) 
  
Smiling -0.11 (0.34) 
Intentions YA Concerned 0.10 (0.79) 
  
Smiling -0.16 (0.60) 
 
OA Concerned -0.10 (0.73) 
  
Smiling -0.03 (0.36) 
     
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
MANCOVA for vaccine-related outcomes. As described above, a MANCOVA 
examined the main effects of age (older vs. younger) and commercial condition 
(smiling vs. concerned doctor) as well as the interaction of age and condition. The 
model also included six covariates; the four experience questions (in order to 
control for experience with the flu and the flu vaccine) the pre-test measure of 
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procedural risk (“If you do get the flu vaccine, how likely are you to experience 
side effects related to the vaccine itself?”) and the pre-test measure of worry 
toward getting the flu (“How worried are you about getting the flu?”). See Table 
10 for a report of the multivariate effects. Regarding the covariates, only baseline 
risk perceptions of vaccine-related side-effects was a significant at the 
multivariate level (Wilk’s = 0.845, F (3 ,68) = 3.90, p = 0.013,  ηp 
2
  = 0.155). No 
other variables in the model were significant in the multivariate analysis. 
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Table 10.  
Multivariate Effects of Age Group, Condition, and Covariates 
     Factor               Wilks' Lambda     F             df              P            ηp 
2
   
Had flu last 
year? 0.993 0.14 (3, 68) 0.935 0.007 
 
Vaccinated last 
year? 0.960 0.89 (3, 68) 0.452 0.040 
 
# vac last 3 
years? 0.941 1.33 (3, 68) 0.272 0.059 
 
Doctor 
recommend? 0.947 1.21 (3, 68) 0.315 0.053 
 
Pre-test 
 Side-effect risk 0.845 3.90 (3, 68) 
   
0.013* 0.155 
 
Pre-Worry about 
flu 0.907 2.20 (3, 68) 0.097 0.093 
 
 
AgeGroup 0.960 0.89 (3, 68) 0.451 0.040 
 
 
Condition 0.911 2.08 (3, 68) 0.112 0.089 
 
AgeGroup * 
Condition 0.956 0.98 (3, 68) 0.408 0.044 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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At the univariate level, the analysis yielded a significant main effect for 
the commercial condition (smiling vs. concerned doctor) on feelings toward the 
flu vaccine (F(1, 70) = 5.95, p = 0.017, ηp 
2 
 = 0.083). Overall, participants felt 
more positively about the flu vaccine in the concerned doctor condition (M = .65, 
SD = 1.35) compared to the smiling doctor condition (M = -.10, SD = 1.44). This 
finding was inconsistent with Hypothesis III. No other univariate main effects in 
the model were found to be significant (see Table 11).  
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Table 11. 
 
Univariate F-test Results of Each Factor on Each of the Outcome Measures  
 
     Factor                     Outcome df               F         P            ηp 
2
   
 
Had flu last year? 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 0.21 0.648 0.003 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.29 0.594 0.004 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 0.01 0.906 0.000 
 
Vacc last year? 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 1.03 0.314 0.015 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.05 0.821 0.001 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 2.02 0.160 0.030 
 
# vac last 3 years? 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 0.32 0.576 0.005 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.26 0.610 0.004 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 1.89 0.174 0.028 
Doctor  
recommend? 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 3.33 0.072 0.048 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.57 0.452 0.009 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 0.14 0.711 0.002 
Pre-test 
 Side-effect risk 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 10.61 0.002* 0.139 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.05 0.822 0.001 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 0.43 0.516 0.006 
Pre-test 
Worry about flu 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 2.29 0.135 0.033 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 2.07 0.155 0.030 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 0.39 0.536 0.006 
 
Condition 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 5.95 0.017* 0.083 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.00 0.982 0.000 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 0.44 0.510 0.007 
 
AgeGroup 
 
Feel Vac (1, 70) 1.27 0.263 0.019 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.66 0.420 0.010 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 0.51 0.478 0.008 
 
Condition * 
AgeGroup 
 
 
(1, 70) 0.50 0.482 0.008 Feel Vac 
 
Risk/ben (1, 70) 0.02 0.878 0.000 
 
Intentions (1, 70) 1.22 0.273 0.018 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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ANCOVA for flu-related worry. An ANCOVA was run on the outcome 
variable representing the extent to which participants’ worried about getting the 
flu. The ANCOVA included the same predictors as the previous MANCOVA. A 
marginally significant age group by commercial condition interaction was found 
F(1, 67) = 3.76  p = 0.057. Given a priori predictions in Hypothesis 4 regarding 
potential interactions between age group and commercial condition, follow-up 
pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine if differences in the change of 
flu-related worry were present between older and younger adults in the same 
condition. In the concerned-doctor condition, changes in flu related worry did not 
differ between older (M =-.18) and younger (M = .45) adults t(39) = -1.23, p = 
.22. Similarly, no differences in the change of flu-related worry were found 
between older (M = .77) and younger (M = .14) adults in the smiling-doctor 
condition t(39) = 1.32, p = .192.  
To better understand the nature of the interaction effect, changes in flu-
related worry were compared across the commercial conditions separately for 
older and younger adults. The extent to which younger adults changed in their 
worry about getting the flu did not differ across the concerned (M = .45) and 
smiling-doctor (M = .14) commercial conditions, t(39) = -.66, p = .514. However, 
older adults who watched the smiling-doctor commercial reported an increase in 
worry about getting the flu (M = .77) compared to those who watched the 
concerned doctors (M = -.17), t(39) = 2.16, p = .034. Overall, this pattern of 
findings did not support the predictions made in Hypothesis IV. 
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Interaction Between Commercial Condition and Affective Responses on 
Changes in Participants’ Evaluations 
 In order to test Hypothesis V, multi-step regression analyses examined 
whether the extent to which the participants’ affective responding (to the 
commercial) related to their changes in evaluations differently across conditions. 
Three multi-step regressions were tested for each of the four outcome variables 
resulting in a total of 12 regressions. The first two steps were identical across all 
12 regressions. The first step of each regression included the covariates 
(experience with the flu & flu vaccines). The second step included factors 
representing the main effects of age and condition. The factors included in the 
third step represented the influence of affective responding and were different 
across the three regressions for each outcome variable. In the first regression for 
each outcome variable, the third step included corrugator and zygomaticus 
activity.   
For the second regression, the third step included variables representing 
changes in valence and arousal (as measured by the difference between the set of 
first and second affect grid scores). Lastly, the third regression included factors 
representing changes in joy, amusement, fear, and sadness (as measured by the 
difference between the first and second set of mDES scores). These models also 
included factors representing all possible interactions between the commercial 
condition and the affective responding variables. In total, 12 multi-step 
regressions were analyzed for each outcome variable. Given that steps 1 and 2 of 
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each regression were not relevant to Hypothesis V, the results for those steps are 
presented in Tables 12 and 13 and are not discussed further. 
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Table 12. 
Steps 1 and 2 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Relating Covariates and Main Effects on Vaccine Feelings and Flu-Related Worry 
 
                                              Feelings about vaccine                     Worry about getting the flu 
 
         b SE   t       p         ΔR2 R2              b    SE       t         p          ΔR2         R2  
Step 1 
     
0.17 0.17* 
     
0.2 0.2* 
Had flu last year? -0.40 -0.49 -0.81 0.422 
 
  
0.02 -0.49 0.03 0.972 
  Vac last year? -0.23 -0.27 -0.84 0.401 
 
  
0.04 -0.27 0.15 0.883 
 
 # vac last 3 years? 0.15 -0.14 1.12 0.266 
 
  
0.15 -0.14 1.12 0.265 
 
 Doctor recommend? 0.74 -0.37 1.96   0.053† 
 
  
0.02 -0.37 0.06 0.905 
 
 Pre-test worry about flu -0.15 -0.12 -1.25 0.217 
 
  
-0.44 -0.12 -3.68 0.000** 
 
 Pre-test side-effect risk 1.97 -0.70 2.80   0.007* 
 
  
-0.23 -0.70 -0.33 0.740 
 
 Step 2 
     
0.09 0.26* 
     
0.07 0.27** 
Had flu last year? -0.22 0.48 -0.46 0.648 
   
-0.02 0.48 -0.04 0.966 
  Vac last year? -0.27 0.26 -1.02 0.314 
   
0.00 0.27 -0.01 0.995 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.08 0.25 0.56 0.576 
   
0.19 0.15 1.32 0.192 
  Doctor recommend? 0.67 0.37 1.83 0.072 
   
0.11 0.37 0.31 0.759 
  Pre-test worry about flu -0.19 0.12 -1.51 0.135 
   
-0.37 0.12 -2.99   0.004** 
  Pre-test side-effect risk 2.25 0.69 3.26  0.002** 
   
-0.44 0.69 -0.64 0.526 
  AgeGroup 
 
0.61 0.48 1.26 0.21 
   
-0.85 0.48 -1.76 0.083 
  Condition 
 
-0.53 0.44 -1.2 0.235 
   
-0.56 0.44 -1.26 0.212 
  AgeGroup*Cond -0.44 0.62 -0.71 0.482 
   
1.52 0.63 2.42 0.018** 
   
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p < .07
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Table 13.  
 
Steps 1 and 2 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Relating Covariates and Main Effects on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores 
 
                                                        Risk/Benefits Score                  Behavioral Intentions Score 
 
         b SE   t    p      ΔR2       R2      b   SE      t          p          ΔR2       R2  
Step 1 
     
0.06 0.06 
     
0.09 0.09 
Had flu last year? -0.05 -0.11 -0.46 0.645 
   
-0.06 -0.23 -0.27 0.786 
  Vac last year? 0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.952 
   
-0.15 -0.13 -1.22 0.226 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.01 -0.03 0.23 0.820 
   
-0.08 -0.06 -1.27 0.207 
  Doctor recommend? 0.08 -0.09 0.89 0.378 
   
0.05 -0.18 0.27 0.790 
  Pre-test worry about flu 0.05 -0.03 1.68 0.097 
   
0.02 -0.06 0.35 0.730 
  Pre-test side-effect risk -0.04 -0.16 -0.25 0.801 
   
0.22 -0.33 0.68 0.501 
  Step 2 
     
0.00 0.06 
     
   0.00 0.09 
Had flu last year? -0.06 0.12 -0.54 0.594 
   
-0.03 0.23 -0.12 0.906 
  Vac last year? 0.01 0.06 0.23 0.821 
   
-0.18 0.13 -1.42 0.160 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.02 0.04 0.51 0.610 
   
-0.10 0.07 -1.37 0.174 
  Doctor recommend? 0.07 0.09 0.76 0.452 
   
0.07 0.18 0.37 0.711 
  Pre-test worry about flu 0.04 0.03 1.44 0.155 
   
0.04 0.06 0.62 0.536 
  Pre-test side-effect risk -0.04 0.17 -0.23 0.822 
   
0.22 0.34 0.65 0.516 
  AgeGroup 
 
-0.06 0.12 -0.48 0.633 
   
-0.05 0.24 -0.21 0.835 
  Version 
 
0.01 0.11 0.13 0.901 
   
-0.27 0.23 -1.25 0.217 
  AgeGroup*Cond -0.02 0.15 -0.15 0.878 
   
0.34 0.31 1.11 0.273 
   
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p < 
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Step 3 of the regressions examining effects of age, condition and fEMG 
activity on each outcome. There were no significant main effects or interactions 
involving the fEMG variables for any of the four outcomes (see Tables 14 and 15 
for a full report of the Step 3 statistics). Interestingly, despite controlling for the 
direct and moderating effects of fEMG activity, the age-group by commercial 
condition interaction that was found in tests of Hypothesis IV remained 
significant (see Table 14). Thus even when controlling for fEMG activity, older 
adults watching the smiling-doctor commercial reported an increase in worry 
relative to older adults who watched the concerned-doctor commercial.  
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Table 14.  
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of fEMG on Vaccine Feelings and Flu-Related Worry 
                                              Feelings about vaccine                     Worry about getting the flu 
                        b        SE          t         p             ΔR2       R2         b       SE         t            p         ΔR2    R2  
Step 3 
    
0.06 0.32 
     
0.1 0.37* 
Had flu last year? -0.31 0.50 -0.61 0.543 
   
0.04 0.49 0.07 0.940 
  Vac last year? -0.28 0.28 -0.99 0.326 
   
0.04 0.27 0.16 0.874 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.06 0.15 0.41 0.681 
   
0.25 0.15 1.64 0.106 
  Doctor recommend? 0.46 0.39 1.19 0.238 
   
0.06 0.38 0.16 0.875 
  
Pre-test worry about flu 
-0.17 0.13 -1.31 0.196 
   
-0.43 0.13 -3.35 
   
0.001** 
  Pre-test side-effect risk 2.21 0.76 2.89    0.005** 
   
0.04 0.75 0.05 0.959 
  AgeGroup 
 
0.74 0.58 1.29 0.202 
   
-0.83 0.56 -1.47 0.147 
  Condition 
 
-0.37 0.60 -0.61 0.541 
   
-0.61 0.59 -1.03 0.309 
  
AgeGroup*Cond 
-0.65 0.76 -0.85 0.397 
   
1.57 0.74 2.11 
   
0.039** 
  Corr_avg 
 
0.23 0.21 1.06 0.295 
   
0.09 0.21 0.45 0.653 
  Zyg_avg 
 
-0.11 0.17 -0.67 0.506 
   
-0.17 0.17 -1.02 0.312 
  AgeGroup*Corr_avg -0.25 0.21 -1.18 0.241 
   
-0.13 0.21 -0.60 0.552 
  Cond*Corr_avg -0.21 0.24 -0.89 0.377 
   
-0.11 0.23 -0.47 0.637 
  AgeGroup* Cond*Corr_avg 0.27 0.25 1.09 0.280 
   
0.07 0.24 0.28 0.777 
  AgeGroup*Zyg_avg -0.48 0.45 -1.08 0.285 
   
-0.25 0.44 -0.56 0.575 
  Cond*Zyg_avg 0.07 0.28 0.27 0.790 
   
0.25 0.27 0.92 0.360 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Zyg_avg 0.69 0.53 1.29 0.201 
   
-0.22 0.52 -0.41 0.680 
   
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p < .07 
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Table 15.  
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of fEMG on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores 
 
                                                           Risk/Benefits Score                  Behavioral Intentions Score 
                b         SE        t            p             ΔR2       R2       b     SE           t          p          ΔR2      R2  
Step 3 
    
0.07 0.13  
    
0.07 0.16 
Had flu last year? -0.02 0.12 -0.16 0.871 
  
-0.03 0.25  -0.14 0.889 
  Vac last year? 0.02 0.07 0.34 0.737 
  
-0.21 0.14  -1.50 0.139 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.02 0.04 0.59 0.560 
  
-0.11 0.08  -1.43 0.157 
  Doctor recommend? 0.11 0.10 1.18 0.245 
  
 0.07 0.19  0.36 0.718 
  Pre-test worry about flu 0.04 0.03 1.22 0.228 
  
 0.01 0.06  0.11 0.913 
  Pre-test side-effect risk 0.00 0.19 -0.02 0.982 
  
 0.47 0.38  1.25 0.216 
  AgeGroup 
 
-0.14 0.14 -0.98 0.330 
  
-0.04  0.28  -0.14 0.889 
  Version 
 
-0.13 0.15 -0.89 0.380 
  
-0.38 0.30  -1.28 0.206 
  AgeGroup*Cond 0.08 0.19 0.45 0.657 
  
 0.41 0.37  1.11 0.272 
  Corr_avg 
 
-0.08 0.05 -1.59 0.117 
  
 0.03 0.11  0.29 0.777 
  Zyg_avg 
 
-0.03 0.04 -0.62 0.541 
  
-0.08 0.08  -0.95 0.344 
  AgeGroup*Corr_avg 0.08 0.05 1.59 0.117 
  
-0.02 0.11  -0.23 0.822 
  Cond*Corr_avg 0.10 0.06 1.66 0.103 
  
 0.03 0.12  0.29 0.774 
  AgeGroup* 
Cond*Corr_avg -0.08 0.06 -1.36 0.179 
  
-0.01 0.12  -0.12 0.906 
  AgeGroup*Zyg_avg 0.13 0.11 1.19 0.237 
  
 0.08 0.22  0.36 0.719 
  Cond*Zyg_avg 0.03 0.07 0.47 0.638 
  
 0.03 0.14  0.22 0.824 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Zyg_avg -0.15 0.13 -1.12 0.266 
  
-0.11  0.26  -0.42 0.679 
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Step 3 of the regressions examining effects of age, condition, valence and 
arousal on each outcome. Tables 16 and 17 present a full report of the Step 3 
statistics for the analyses examining effects of age, condition, valence and arousal 
on the four outcome variables. As can be seen on Table 16, a near-significant age 
x valence interaction (p = .057) was yielded in the regression predicting worry 
about getting the flu. Although not predicted, this interaction was further explored 
because of its potential relevance to the overarching topic of this study. To do so, 
the continuous valence-change scores of the participants were collapsed into three 
categorical levels: high, medium and low levels of valence change. The high level 
incorporated all valence change scores that were one standard deviation above the 
mean, the medium level incorporated all the valence change scores that were 
between one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above 
the mean, and the low level incorporated scores that were one standard deviation 
below the mean. As mentioned previously, higher scores on this variable indicate 
increases in positive valence from before viewing the commercial to after viewing 
the commercial.  
Subsequently, the worry scores of younger and older adults were 
separately examined, i.e., compared across the three valence-change levels. For 
younger adults, the worry scores at the three levels of the valence change variable 
(high M = .33, medium M = .28, low M = .23) were not significantly different 
from one another (p’s >.05). For older adults, the worry scores at each level of the 
valence change variable were significantly different from one another (p’s < .05). 
Thus, older adults who experienced high levels of valence change reported 
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worrying less about the flu (M = -.56) than older adults who experienced medium  
(M = .37, t(39) = -3.83 , p < .001) and low levels of valence change (M = 1.30, 
t(39) = -3.83, p < .001).  This indicates that increases in positive valence related to 
less flu-related worry for older adults.  No other main or interaction effects 
involving effects of valence and arousal on any of the outcome variables were 
significant (see Tables 16 and 17).
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Table 16.  
 
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Valence and Arousal on Vaccine Feelings and Flu-Related Worry 
 
                                                           Feelings about vaccine                     Worry about getting the flu 
             b      SE          t            p           ΔR2      R2         b    SE         t            p  ΔR2         R2  
Step 3 
 
0.05 0.31 
     
0.27 0.54** 
Had flu last year? -0.28 0.60 -0.48 0.635 
  
 0.42  0.50 0.85 0.398 
  Vac last year? -0.25 0.30 -0.83 0.411 
  
 0.04  0.25 0.15 0.885 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.10 0.16 0.64 0.525 
  
 0.15  0.14 1.07 0.290 
  Doctor recommend? 0.60 0.40 1.50 0.140 
  
 0.35  0.33 1.05 0.297 
  Pre-test worry about flu -0.22 0.13 -1.69 0.097 
  
-0.32  0.11 -2.93     0.005** 
  Pre-test side-effect risk 2.40 0.75 3.17    0.002** 
  
  -0.82  0.63 -1.30 0.199 
  AgeGroup 
 
0.50 0.51 0.97 0.339 
  
-0.76  0.43 -1.77 0.082 
  Condition 
 
-0.50 0.48 -1.03 0.308 
  
-0.72  0.40 -1.81 0.076 
  AgeGroup*Cond -0.45 0.67 -0.66 0.510 
  
 1.56  0.56 2.78    0.007** 
  Valence 
 
0.07 0.26 0.25 0.805 
  
 0.26  0.22 1.19 0.239 
  AgeGroup*Valence 0.07 0.33 0.21 0.834 
  
-0.53  0.28 -1.90   0.063† 
  Cond*Valence -0.18 0.63 -0.29 0.774 
  
-0.42  0.52 -0.80 0.425 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Valence 0.11 0.77 0.14 0.891 
  
-0.34  0.64 -0.53 0.597 
  Arousal 
 
0.03 0.18 0.14 0.889 
  
-0.03  0.15 -0.22 0.826 
  AgeGroup*Arousal -0.24 0.25 -0.96 0.339 
  
 0.36  0.21 1.70 0.095 
  Cond*Arousal -0.15 0.30 -0.51 0.610 
  
 0.08  0.25 0.31 0.756 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Arousal 0.53 0.38 1.38 0.172 
  
-0.58  0.32 -1.85 0.070 
   
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; † p < .07 
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Table 17.  
 
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects Of Valence and Arousal on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores 
 
                                                           Risk/Benefits Score                  Behavioral Intentions Score 
                                  b             SE            t     p         ΔR2       R2           b        SE          t          p           ΔR2         R2  
Step 3 
    
0.14 0.2 
     
0.06 0.15 
Had flu last year? 0.03 0.14  0.19 0.850 
   
0.00 0.29 0.02 0.987 
  Vac last year? 0.03 0.07  0.44 0.663 
   
-0.16 0.15 -1.09 0.281 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.01 0.04  0.36 0.722 
   
-0.08 0.08 -0.96 0.342 
  Doctor recommend? 0.07 0.09  0.78 0.439 
   
0.13 0.20 0.64 0.527 
  Pre-test worry about flu 0.05 0.03  1.59 0.116 
   
0.04 0.06 0.61 0.545 
  Pre-test side-effect risk -0.07 0.17 -0.41 0.681 
   
0.10 0.37 0.26 0.793 
  AgeGroup 
 
-0.09 0.12 -0.77 0.445 
   
-0.08 0.25 -0.33 0.742 
  Version 
 
-0.02 0.11 -0.22 0.829 
   
-0.22 0.24 -0.92 0.363 
  AgeGroup*Cond 0.03 0.15  0.20 0.844 
   
0.30 0.33 0.92 0.361 
  Valence 
 
-0.07 0.06 -1.11 0.270 
   
0.02 0.13 0.16 0.875 
  AgeGroup*Valence 0.00 0.08  0.06 0.954 
   
-0.09 0.16 -0.55 0.584 
  Cond*Valence 0.10 0.14  0.70 0.489 
   
-0.15 0.31 -0.50 0.622 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Valence -0.07 0.18 -0.42 0.677 
   
0.23 0.38 0.62 0.540 
  Arousal 
 
0.05 0.04  1.25 0.216 
   
0.00 0.09 -0.05 0.963 
  AgeGroup*Arousal -0.15 0.06 -2.63 0.011  
   
0.00 0.12 0.00 0.998 
  Cond*Arousal -0.02 0.07 -0.32 0.753 
   
-0.12 0.15 -0.80 0.427 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Arousal 0.14 0.09  1.65 0.105 
   
0.02 0.19 0.11 0.913 
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Step 3 of the regressions examining effects of age, condition, and mDES 
emotions on each outcome. Tables 18 and 19 present a full report of the Step 3 
statistics for the analyses examining effects of age, condition, and mDES 
emotions (joy, amusement, fear, and sadness) on the four outcome variables There 
were no significant main effects or interactions involving any of the mDES 
variables on the outcome variables representing feelings toward the flu and worry 
about contracting the flu. Interestingly, despite controlling for the influence of the 
mDES variables, the interaction found between age-group and commercial 
condition (smiling doctor vs. concerned doctor) in the test of Hypothesis IV 
remained significant such that older adults in the smiling-doctor condition 
reported more flu-related worry in comparison to older adults in the concerned-
doctor condition. 
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Table 18.  
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of mDES measures on Vaccine Feelings and Worry about Getting the 
Flu. 
                                                           Feelings about vaccine                     Worry about getting the flu 
             b   SE       t    p         ΔR2      R2         b   SE      t           p             ΔR2       R2  
Step 3 
 
0.14 0.4 
     
0.29 0.56** 
Had flu last year? -0.57 0.62 -0.91 0.368 
   
0.19 0.54 0.34 0.733 
  Vac last year? -0.27 0.33 -0.80 0.425 
   
-0.11 0.29 -0.37 0.714 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.810 
   
0.15 0.15 1.01 0.317 
  Doctor recommend? 0.72 0.43 1.67 0.102 
   
0.36 0.38 0.94 0.349 
  Pre-test worry about flu -0.17 0.15 -1.17 0.246 
   
-0.30 0.13 -2.41 0.02* 
  Pre-test side-effect risk 2.06 0.83 2.50 0.016 
   
-0.52 0.72 -0.72 0.477 
  AgeGroup 
 
0.79 0.60 1.31 0.195 
   
-0.52 0.53 -0.98 0.332 
  Condition 
 
-0.58 0.54 -1.06 0.292 
   
-0.71 0.47 -1.49 0.141 
  AgeGroup*Cond -0.65 0.81 -0.80 0.426 
   
1.52 0.71 2.14   0.037* 
  Joy 
 
0.15 0.29 0.53 0.599 
   
-0.03 0.25 -0.13 0.893 
  AgeGroup*Joy 0.19 0.54 0.35 0.730 
   
0.39 0.48 0.83 0.411 
  Cond*Joy 
 
-0.50 0.57 -0.88 0.381 
   
-0.24 0.50 -0.49 0.624 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Joy 0.10 0.83 0.12 0.905 
   
0.20 0.72 0.28 0.780 
  Amusement 0.04 0.34 0.11 0.910 
   
0.13 0.30 0.43 0.671 
  AgeGroup*Amuse -0.03 0.81 -0.04 0.967 
   
-1.22 0.71 -1.72 0.092 
  Cond*Amuse -0.40 0.61 -0.66 0.515 
   
0.00 0.53 0.01 0.996 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Amuse 0.94 1.03 0.91 0.366 
   
0.85 0.90 0.95 0.348 
  Fear 
 
0.21 0.35 0.60 0.551 
   
0.54 0.30 1.78 0.081 
  AgeGroup*Fear -1.83 0.98 -1.88 0.066 
   
1.33 0.85 1.56 0.124 
  Cond*Fear 
 
-0.64 1.10 -0.58 0.568 
   
-0.85 0.96 -0.88 0.382 
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AgeGroup*Cond*Fear 2.37 1.95 1.21 0.231 
   
-2.74 1.70 -1.61 0.114 
  Sadness 
 
-0.57 0.52 -1.09 0.279 
   
-0.31 0.45 -0.67 0.503 
  AgeGroup*Sadness 0.14 0.82 0.17 0.869 
   
1.09 0.71 1.53 0.132 
  Cond*Sadness 0.36 1.27 0.28 0.780 
   
0.31 1.11 0.28 0.782 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Sadness 0.32 1.62 0.20 0.846 
   
0.20 1.41 0.14 0.890 
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For the outcome variable representing the difference between the risk and 
benefits of flu vaccines, a significant age group by fear interaction was observed 
(see Table 19). As mentioned above, positive values for the risk/benefit score 
indicate that the participant perceived more benefits and fewer risks related to the 
flu vaccine. The interaction was explored further by testing simple slopes for the 
association between age group and changes in self-reported fear on the mDES.  
To do so, the continuous fear-change scores of the participants were collapsed 
into three categorical levels: high, medium and low levels of fear change (i.e., 
change from before to after viewing the stimulus face). The high level 
incorporated all fear-change scores that were one standard deviation above the 
mean, the medium level incorporated all the fear-change scores that were between 
one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the 
mean, and the low level incorporated scores that were one standard deviation 
below the mean. As mentioned previously, higher scores on this variable indicate 
increases in fear from before viewing the commercial to after viewing the 
commercial. Subsequently, the risk/benefit scores of younger and older adults 
were separately examined, i.e., compared across the three fear-change levels. For 
younger adults, the slopes (representing the relation between fear change and the 
risk/benefit score) at the three levels of the fear change variable (high M = -.01, 
medium M = -.02, low M = -.05) did not differ from one another (p’s >.05). For 
older adults, the slopes at each level of fear change were significantly different 
from one another. Thus, older adults who experienced high levels of changes in 
fear demonstrated lower risk/benefit scores (M = -.34,) in comparison to older 
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adults who experienced medium (M = -.05, t(39) = -2.59, p = .013) and lower 
levels (M = .23, t(39) = -2.59, p = .013) of changes in fear. This indicates that for 
older adults, greater increases in fear were related to lower risk/benefit scores. 
More specifically, the more fear older adults experienced as a result of viewing 
the commercial, the more risky they perceived the flu vaccine to be.  
For the variable representing changes in behavioral intentions regarding 
the flu vaccine, a three-way (age group by condition by joy) interaction emerged 
(see Table 12). The interaction between condition and change in joy (i.e., 
differences in joy score from before to after viewing the commercial) was also 
significant but was not interpretable in the model as it was qualified by the 
significant three-way interaction. To further examine the three-way interaction, 
regression analyses were conducted for older and younger adults separately. For 
the younger adults, the interaction between commercial condition and joy-change 
scores was significant, b = -.67, t(39) = -2.34, p = .030, whereas the interaction 
was not significant in the regression for older adults, b = .46, t(39) = 1.55, p = 
.134.  
The significant commercial x joy interaction in the younger adult 
regression was explored further by examining the simple slopes representing the 
influence of changes in joy on the intentions score for each commercial condition 
separately. As in the previous examinations of simple effects, the continuous joy-
change scores of the participants were collapsed into three categorical levels: 
high, medium and low levels of joy change (i.e., change from before to after 
viewing the stimulus face). The high level incorporated all joy-change scores that 
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were one standard deviation above the mean, the medium level incorporated all 
the joy-change scores that were between one standard deviation below the mean 
and one standard deviation above the mean, and the low level incorporated scores 
that were one standard deviation below the mean. As mentioned previously, 
higher scores on this variable indicate increases in joy from before viewing the 
commercial to after viewing the commercial. Subsequently, the intentions scores 
of younger adults in the smiling and concerned-doctor condition were separately 
examined, i.e., compared across the three joy-change levels.  The analyses 
showed that changes in intentions scores differed across conditions only for those 
younger adults who experienced changes in joy that were one standard deviation 
above the mean. Younger adults in the concerned doctor condition who 
experienced high levels of increases in joy had marginally greater intentions (M = 
.38) compared to the younger adults in the smiling doctor condition who also had 
the highest increases in joy (M = -.46) t(39) = -2.04,  p = 0.055.
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Table 19.  
 
Step 3 of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining Effects of mDES measures on Risk/Benefits and Intentions Scores  
 
                                                           Risk/Benefits Score                  Behavioral Intentions Score 
               b         SE          t            p             ΔR2       R2       b     SE       t            p              ΔR2         R2  
Step 3- 
    
0.22 0.28 
     
0.28 0.37 
Had flu last year? -0.17 0.15 -1.14 0.260 
   
-0.17 0.28 -0.61 0.547 
  Vac last year? 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.951 
   
-0.18 0.15 -1.20 0.235 
  # vac last 3 years? 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.940 
   
-0.15 0.08 -1.87 0.067 
  Doctor recommend? 0.03 0.10 0.30 0.766 
   
0.04 0.20 0.20 0.841 
  Pre-test worry about flu 0.03 0.03 0.98 0.331 
   
0.04 0.07 0.62 0.539 
  Pre-test side-effect risk 0.01 0.20 0.03 0.974 
   
0.00 0.38 -0.01 0.991 
  AgeGroup -0.03 0.14 -0.24 0.814 
   
0.04 0.27 0.16 0.874 
  Version -0.02 0.13 -0.17 0.865 
   
-0.33 0.25 -1.33 0.188 
  AgeGroup*Cond -0.12 0.19 -0.63 0.531 
   
0.47 0.37 1.26 0.213 
  Joy 0.04 0.07 0.59 0.559 
   
0.23 0.13 1.74 0.088 
  AgeGroup*Joy -0.10 0.13 -0.75 0.457 
   
-0.46 0.25 -1.84 0.071 
  Cond*Joy -0.01 0.14 -0.09 0.926 
   
-0.59 0.26 -2.27         0.027* 
 AgeGroup*Cond*Joy -0.09 0.20 -0.45 0.654 
   
0.79 0.38 2.10         0.041* 
 Amusement -0.01 0.08 -0.10 0.922 
   
-0.13 0.15 -0.83 0.411 
  AgeGroup*Amuse 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.992 
   
-0.14 0.37 -0.39 0.699 
  Cond*Amuse 0.10 0.15 0.66 0.514 
   
-0.19 0.28 -0.68 0.500 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Amuse -0.06 0.25 -0.24 0.814 
   
0.27 0.47 0.57 0.568 
  Fear 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.873 
   
-0.13 0.16 -0.85 0.402 
  AgeGroup*Fear -0.51 0.23 -2.17  0.035* 
   
0.01 0.44 0.02 0.988 
  Cond*Fear 0.06 0.26 0.22 0.826 
   
0.28 0.50 0.55 0.584 
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AgeGroup*Cond*Fear 0.01 0.46 0.03 0.980 
   
0.16 0.89 0.18 0.856 
  Sadness -0.03 0.12 -0.26 0.794 
   
-0.21 0.24 -0.88 0.384 
  AgeGroup*Sadness -0.26 0.19 -1.32 0.193 
   
0.46 0.37 1.22 0.227 
  Cond*Sadness -0.23 0.30 -0.76 0.450 
   
-0.66 0.58 -1.15 0.255 
  AgeGroup*Cond*Sadness 0.28 0.39 0.73 0.466 
   
0.51 0.74 0.69 0.494 
  
 98 
Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to explore how affective responses to emotional 
expressions presented during an influenza vaccine commercial could change 
participants’ evaluations of the flu vaccine (i.e., behavioral intentions, risk 
perceptions, and integral feelings). The study also included older and younger 
adults to examine whether age-related increases in the preference for positive over 
negative information could lead to differential influences of positive and negative 
facial expressions on the above-mentioned evaluations.   
 The overall pattern of results indicates that younger adults were somewhat 
more affected than older adults by the facial expression manipulation in terms of 
self-reported changes in affect. Regarding the influence of the manipulation on 
evaluations, the concerned doctors elicited more positive feelings about the flu 
vaccine for both older and younger adults. Furthermore, a significant interaction 
between age group and condition on flu-related worry demonstrated that in 
comparison to their younger counterparts, the facial manipulation only influenced 
the worry evaluations of older adults. In addition, findings suggest that the 
evaluations of older and younger adults depended on their changes in affect from 
before to after watching the commercial. The next sections discuss the results for 
the tests of each hypothesis in greater detail.    
The Influence of Age Group and Condition on Affective Responding  
For Hypothesis I, an effect of the commercial condition (smiling vs. 
concerned doctor) on participants’ changes in affective states was predicted. 
Specifically, it was predicted that relative to the concerned-doctor commercial, 
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participants watching the smiling-doctor commercial would report increases in 
positive affect, joy, amusement, and zygomaticus activity. This prediction was 
partially supported. Across age groups, participants who watched the smiling 
doctor were more amused than those who watched the concerned doctor. No other 
affective measure, including fEMG measures, differed across the commercial 
conditions.  
Hypothesis II predicted an age group by condition interaction in which 
older adults would report more positive change in valence and positive discrete 
emotions in the smile condition than would younger adults and would report less 
negative change in valence and negative discrete emotions in the concerned-
doctor condition. A significant age group by condition interaction was obtained, 
yet it was not in line with the predictions. That is, only younger adults differed in 
affective responding across commercial conditions. Specifically, younger adults 
who watched the smiling doctor reported a greater increase in amusement than 
those who watched the concerned doctor.  In fact, the latter reported a decrease in 
amusement.  
The lack of difference in amusement across conditions for older adults 
implies that younger adults may be more likely to be impacted by incidental facial 
expressions in terms of their self-reported affect. Interestingly, the marginally 
significant main effect of age group on amusement indicated that older adults 
might have been more amused across both conditions. This finding may indicate a 
general tendency for older adults to experience more positive affect (albeit 
amusement) regardless of the facial expressions they observed during the 
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commercial. However, given that the effect did not reach a conventional level of 
significance, no conclusion can be confidently drawn.  
Interestingly, older adults demonstrated lower levels of baseline-relative 
zygomaticus activity in both conditions. This finding is consistent with previous 
work suggesting that older adults have overall lower levels of facial responding to 
affective facial stimuli (e.g., Slessor et al., 2014). However, lower levels of facial 
responding may not necessarily reflect lower levels of experienced emotion. This 
possible dissociation between facial activity and self-reported emotion is also 
suggested by this study’s finding that younger adults did not differ in their 
corrugator or zygomaticus activity across conditions but did report increases in 
amusement.  
The Influence of Age Group and Condition on Evaluations of the Flu and Flu 
Vaccine 
For Hypothesis III it was proposed that participants in the negative 
concerned-doctor condition would report a greater increase in how much they 
were worried about getting the flu and their perceived risks of vaccination 
compared to participants in the positive smiling-doctor condition. In addition, it 
was predicted that participants in the positive smiling-doctor condition would 
report a greater increase in how positively they felt about the vaccines themselves, 
and in their behavioral intentions regarding vaccines compared to those in the 
negative concerned-doctor condition.  
Although a significant effect was found for the influence of commercial 
condition on evaluations of the flu vaccine, it was not in the predicted direction. 
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Across age groups, participants felt more positively about the flu vaccine in the 
concerned-doctor condition compared to the smiling-doctor condition. Due to the 
complexity of the stimuli (see limitations), it is difficult to determine exactly why 
participants felt more positively about the vaccine after watching the concerned 
doctors.  
An examination of the effects (or lack thereof) of the commercial 
condition on the other outcome measures potentially could shed some light on 
why concerned doctors made participants feel better about the vaccine. Across 
age groups, the expressions of the doctors had no impact on either the risk/benefit 
or behavioral intentions scores (other than for a small subset of younger adults 
who experienced relatively high increases in the experience of joy, see discussion 
below). Moreover, as will be discussed below in greater detail, changes in flu-
related worry differed by condition only for older adult participants. Thus it is 
especially difficult to determine participants watching the concerned doctors felt 
better about the vaccine relative to those who watched the smiling doctors. 
It is possible that the increase in positive feelings about the flu vaccine for 
participants in the concerned-doctor condition resulted from greater affective 
compatibility between the facial expressions and audio message in the concerned 
doctor condition. Insofar as the expressions of the concerned doctors matched the 
serious tone of the recorded message, feelings about the vaccine may have been 
bolstered. In contrast, the jovial expressions and the serious messages in the 
smiling-doctor condition may have been perceived as incongruent. Future 
research is needed to examine how participants’ feelings toward a target are 
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influenced by the affective congruence between the visual and informational 
components of a message. 
For Hypothesis IV an interaction was predicted between age group and 
condition on changes in evaluations toward the flu and the flu vaccine. 
Specifically, it was predicted that compared to their younger counterparts, older 
adults would have greater positive changes in evaluations toward the flu and the 
flu vaccine in the smiling-doctor condition and less negative changes in 
evaluations of the flu in the concerned-doctor condition. The results only 
indicated a significant age group by condition interaction on changes in the extent 
to which participants were worried about getting the flu after watching the 
commercial. For Hypothesis IV, it was predicted that evaluations would differ 
between older and younger adults within the same condition. Although the results 
did not support this specific prediction, it was discovered that older adults’ who 
watched the smiling-doctors reported an increase in worry about getting the flu 
compared their age mates who watched the concerned doctors. In fact, older 
adults in the concerned-doctor condition actually reported being less worried 
about the flu than before viewing the commercial. Younger adults were not 
differentially influenced by the commercial condition.  
Given that older (and younger) adults felt more positively about the flu 
vaccine after watching the concerned doctors, it follows that they would then also 
be less worried about contracting the flu. Interestingly, younger adults did not 
differ in their worry-change scores across commercial conditions. This may imply 
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that younger adults’ perceived susceptibility for contracting the flu is not easily 
manipulated by affective facial expressions in flu commercials.    
Overall, the presence of direct and moderating effects of the commercial 
condition on some outcomes and not others may imply that manipulating the 
doctors’ facial expressions only impacted more general affective evaluations (i.e., 
worry about the flu and feelings about the vaccine) rather than more cognitive 
evaluations of risks and benefits or behavioral intentions.  
The Moderating Influences of Changes in Affective Responding on Flu 
Vaccine and Flu-Related Evaluations 
Hypothesis V proposed that the extent to which participants changed their 
evaluations of the flu and flu vaccines would not only differ across conditions and 
age groups, but that it would also depend on how the participants were 
emotionally impacted by the commercials. Partial support for this prediction was 
present for two of the outcome variables: feelings about the flu vaccine, and the 
risk/benefit score. Importantly, significant moderating effects of only the self-
reported measures of affective valence and discrete emotions were observed. 
Measures of fEMG activity did not have any direct or moderating effects on any 
of the outcome variables.  
The interaction of age group and valence change on feelings about the flu 
vaccine was marginally significant. Although this interaction was not predicted, 
the simple slopes were further explored because of the potential relevance of such 
an interaction to the overarching topic of this study. Across conditions, older 
adults who reported greater pre- vs. post-viewing increases in positive valence 
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were less worried about contracting the flu than were older adults who reported 
lesser increases in positive valence. No effect of valence on flu-related worry was 
present for younger adults. Similarly, for the risk/benefit score, an age group by 
fear change interaction was found. Follow-up analyses indicated that the more 
fear older adults experienced as a result of the commercial, the more risky they 
perceived the flu vaccine to be.  
Given that older and younger adults did not differ in terms of their 
changes in valence or fear across conditions, this pattern of results may imply that 
evaluations of potentially negative outcomes (i.e., risk of contracting the flu, 
experiencing side effects) are influenced by changes in state affect for older adults 
only. More research is needed to confirm that this influence of affect is only 
evident for potentially negative outcomes or if it can be extended to positive 
outcomes as well for older adults. 
Lastly, for intentions toward vaccination, an age group by condition 
interaction was moderated further by the extent to which participants changed in 
their experience of joy. Specifically, younger adults in the concerned-doctor 
condition who experienced the highest increases in joy had greater behavioral 
intentions compared to the younger adults in the smiling-doctor condition who 
also had the highest increases in joy. This pattern of results is difficult to explain 
given that changes in the experience of joy (or any other affective variable) did 
not predict changes in other evaluations (e.g., risk/benefit score, feelings about the 
vaccine or worry about the flu) for younger adults. Therefore, based on the other 
patterns in the data, it is not clear why the intentions of younger adults with high 
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levels of joy differed across the emotion conditions. Furthermore, this finding is 
limited in its external generalizability given that younger adults’ intention scores 
changed across condition only when they experienced above average changes in 
joy. Thus, relative to older adults, younger adults’ affective responding to the 
commercial was not as closely related to changes in evaluations.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
Several limitations of the current study restricted the interpretability of the 
results. First and foremost, the commercial stimuli were extremely complex as 
they were originally intended to resemble a commercial advertisement. This 
complexity stemmed in part from the content of the messages, which discussed 
information about the flu and flu vaccines. Information about the flu pertained to 
its symptomology and contagiousness. Information about the vaccine consisted of 
framed messages promoting vaccination and a brief mention of the potential for 
vaccine-related side effects. A mix of positively and negatively framed messages 
was used in order to provide an affectively balanced promotion of flu vaccines. 
This balance was important given that the differential framing of health 
promotion messages can change affective evaluations of those messages (Mikels 
et al., under revision).  
In summary, the main stimuli in this study included mixed affective 
information accompanied by videos in which facial expressions were either 
consistent or inconsistent with the serious tone of the messages. This complexity 
made it difficult to interpret whether the affective and evaluative reactions to the 
task were due to the messages or the faces. Future research with aims similar to 
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the present investigation should thus use more concise and uniformly framed 
messages that pertain to one target (e.g., the vaccine itself).    
Furthermore, given that the commercial conditions failed to elicit different 
patterns of facial activity, certain methodological changes to the task can be 
considered for future research. For instance, more control could have been 
achieved by presenting participants with a video of the doctors posing a neutral 
expression rather than a blank screen during the baseline period. Such a video 
would provide researchers with a baseline period that was more comparable to the 
actual facial stimuli, thus making the baseline-relative fEMG scores more valid 
measures of differences in facial responding to affective stimuli.   
Conclusion 
Overall, results of this study suggest that concerned rather than happy 
facial expression may be more effective at increasing positive feelings toward 
vaccinations given that both older and younger adults who watched the concerned 
doctors felt more positively about the vaccine. Furthermore, older adults’ 
evaluations of the flu and the flu vaccine were dependent on their changes in 
affective responding to the commercial. Specifically, increased self-reported 
positive affect was related to decreased worry about getting the flu. Furthermore, 
when older participants reported increased fear they also perceived the flu vaccine 
to be more risky than beneficial. These findings imply that changes in state affect 
resulting for acquiring information about a target behavior can change evaluations 
of that behavior, especially for older adults.  
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General Discussion 
Affect, regardless of whether it is related (integral) or unrelated 
(incidental) to the present decision or evaluation target, can influence how 
individuals evaluate uncertain prospects and can thus have significant 
implications for decisions involving risk (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 
2014). Specifically, incidental affective states that are positive have been 
associated with increased risk-seeking behavior whereas negative states have been 
associated with risk-averse behavior.  
Some of the most prominent and potent sources of incidental affect are 
facial expressions. Merely viewing facial expressions has in some cases been 
sufficient enough to elicit emotional experiences that corresponded to the viewed 
expression (Lishner, Cooter, & Zald, 2008; Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Muenz, 
1994). Moreover, in demonstrations of the facial feedback hypothesis, the 
production of emotional facial expressions (either through spontaneous mimicry 
or through instructed posing) has elicited affective experiences that corresponded 
to the produced expression (e.g., Larsen et al., 1992). Converging evidence 
suggests that facial expressions can create an affective context that can impact 
risk-related evaluations and decisions (e.g., Habib, Cassotti, Moutier, Houdé, & 
Borst, 2015; Murphy, & Zajonc, 1993; Ottati, Terkildsen, & Hubbard, 1997). 
Given these findings, it is surprising that so few studies have examined whether 
emotional facial expressions are capable of influencing more complex risk-related 
decisions and evaluation in the real world domains of health and finance. 
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Thus, the overarching goal of the present investigation was to examine the 
role of emotional facial expressions in risk-related judgments and decisions. The 
first study aimed to examine how posing emotional facial expressions influenced 
risk-taking and risk-avoidant behavior in a financial investment task. The second 
study aimed to examine how emotional expressions presented during an influenza 
vaccine commercial could change participants’ evaluations and feelings regarding 
the flu and the flu vaccine. Each study also examined how either risk-related 
decisions or evaluations were associated with individuals’ affective responding to 
either the posing (Study 1) or passive viewing (Study 2) of facial expressions.  
Furthermore, both studies assessed whether multiple forms of affective 
responding could moderate the influence that different affective facial expressions 
had on the decision or evaluation being made. In addition to assessing affective 
responding via self-report measures of affect, both studies measured facial 
electromyography (fEMG) in order to capture participants’ facial muscle activity 
as they either posed or passively viewed facial expressions. Each study examined 
whether decisions or evaluations were guided not only by the valence of a facial 
expression, but also by the extent to which participants modeled the facial 
expression stimuli (either via instructions in Study 1 or spontaneously in Study 2). 
Overall, the effects of posing and viewing facial expressions that were found in 
previous research were not replicated in either of the present studies.   
Although the main hypotheses were not supported, there was limited support for 
the general relations between affective responding and risk-related decisions 
(Study 1) and evaluations (Study 2). The next section contextualizes the findings 
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of each study in the larger literature on facial expressions and affective 
responding. Afterwards, a discussion will follow regarding the overall 
implications of the present research on our understanding of how emotional facial 
expressions can influence complex risk-related decisions and evaluation. 
 
Impact of Present Research on Understanding How Emotional Facial 
Expressions Influence Self-Reported Affect 
In both studies, the manipulations of facial expressions did not have the 
expected influence on participants’ affective responding. The first study predicted 
that posing facial expressions would influence self-reported affect. Specifically, it 
was predicted that posing fearful faces would induce the greatest decrease in self-
reported valence and that posing happy expressions would result in an increase in 
valence. Even though these predictions were well reasoned and based on previous 
research, the results were not consistent with the above-mentioned findings in the 
previous literature. Specifically, although participants’ patterns of fEMG activity 
demonstrated that they followed the instructions in the posing task overall, 
participants reported the greatest reduction in valence in the neutral affect 
condition. 
One can speculate that methodological differences between Study 1 and 
previous research may have contributed to the absence of the predicted effects. 
Perhaps the current posing task had more of an integral rather than incidental 
effect as it was performed embedded between the blocks of the investment task. 
In addition the instructions, which required participants to rate the intensity of the 
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faces, could have also introduced an integral focus on the facial expressions. 
Thus, it is possible that from the participants’ perspective, the posing task was a 
central part of the investment task rather than an unrelated, incidental component. 
Such an explicit posing procedure is methodologically different from previous 
research that used less explicit techniques. For instance, holding a pen in the 
mouth in a manner that creates different expressions has been shown to 
manipulate participants’ feeling states (Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-
Ker, 2001; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988).  
Alternately, it is important to note that explicit posing tasks used in early 
research on facial feedback and emotion were successful in changing self-reported 
affective states (e.g., Laird, 1974). Such early studies embedded the facial posing 
manipulation within a larger experimental context that involved making social 
evaluations. Thus it is possible that facial posing manipulations may be more 
affectively influential if embedded within social decisions rather than financial 
decisions which are more individualistic in nature and may thus restrict the 
influence of more socially-manifested phenomena such as facial feedback.  
The second study examined whether manipulating the facial expressions 
of doctors (smiling vs. concerned) in a flu vaccine commercial could alter 
participants’ affective responses as assessed by fEMG and self-reported measures 
of affect and emotion. The study included older and younger adult samples as the 
presence of an age-related shift in the preference for positive over negative 
information suggests that positive and negative facial expressions could differ in 
how they influence the affective responding of older and younger adults. Age 
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differences in patterns of self-reported affective responding did indeed emerge 
and were somewhat consistent with overall greater age-related positivity in 
response to emotion inductions (Chou et al., 2007). Specifically, in the current 
study, younger adults who watched the concerned doctors demonstrated reduced 
amusement relative to their age mates who watched the smiling doctors. In 
contrast, older adult participants reported similar levels of amusement across the 
video conditions and reported marginally greater amusement overall in 
comparison to younger adults.  
Moreover, no effects of the doctors’ expressions were found on 
participants’ fEMG responses to the commercials. Based on previous research, the 
positive expressions of the doctors should have elicited greater zygomaticus 
activation, whereas the negative expressions should have elicited greater 
corrugator activation (Bailey et al., 2009). Importantly, previous research 
examining the effect of viewing different facial expressions on fEMG activity has 
used only pictures or videos of facial expressions (e.g., Bailey et al., 2009; Hess, 
& Blairy, 2001). However, facial EMG activity is sensitive to emotional words 
and affective pictures in addition to facial expressions (Lang et al, 1993; Larsen et 
al., 2003). Thus, it is possible that the predicted fEMG responses to smiling and 
concerned faces were obscured by the fEMG responses to the complex audio 
message, which included affectively mixed messages regarding risks and benefits.  
Unlike Study 1, in which the affective responses to the faces were due to 
only the facial posing task, affective responses in Study 2 could have been due to 
the messages that were in the commercials. Thus, future research using complex 
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stimuli (affective faces and messages) may consider asking participants how 
specific components of a commercial made them feel. For instance, participants 
could be asked “how did the doctors in the commercial make you feel?” 
separately from “how did the information in the commercial make you feel?”. 
Furthermore, to fully understand the differential effects of the audio and visual 
components of the commercials, future studies should present participants with 
affective videos and recorded messages at separate times in order to isolate 
affective responses to each type of stimuli.  
Impact of Present Research on Understanding How Emotional Facial 
Expressions can Influence Risk-Related Decisions and Evaluations 
In Study 1, it was predicted that relative to the other facial posing 
conditions, participants would mistakenly select more safe bonds (i.e., be more 
risk averse) when they posed the negative fear faces. Participants were also 
expected to make more risk-seeking mistakes when they posed the positive 
affective expressions (happy) relative to the other posing conditions. Although 
these predictions were based on the previously described relations between 
incidental affect and risk-related decision making, the facial posing manipulation 
did not have the predicted effect on risk-related decision making.  
Furthermore, the predictions made regarding the moderating role of 
affective responding on the relationship between the posing condition and risk-
related decision making were not supported. Interestingly though, a relationship 
did emerge between fEMG activity and risk seeking in the neutral condition. 
Although participants were instructed to pose the neutral faces, decreased 
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corrugator activation and increased zygomaticus activation were related to 
increased risk seeking. It is possible that fEMG activity during the posing of 
neutral faces was evidence of feeling states that were not consciously recognized. 
If this were the case, fEMG may be more sensitive than other self-report measures 
of emotion, especially in decision making research that aims to assess how 
affective responses to facial or other emotional stimuli can guide risky decision 
making. 
Although unexpected, the associations between facial responding and risk 
seeking were consistent with previous research linking corrugator (vs. 
zygomaticus) activity to negative (vs. positive) affect, which is associated to 
decreased (vs. increased) risk seeking. This study is among the first to link fEMG 
responses to risk-related decision making in a manner that reflects the previously 
defined relations between affective experiences and risk seeking. Thus, Study 2 
demonstrated the potential utility of fEMG measures in decision-making research.  
In contrast to Study 1, Study 2 did not find any relations between 
participants’ fEMG activity and their changes in evaluations of the flu or the flu 
vaccine. Nonetheless, the study demonstrated that viewing incidentally presented 
facial expressions can influence evaluations of unrelated targets such as the flu or 
flu vaccines. Compared to those who watched the smiling doctors, older and 
younger adults who watched the concerned doctors felt more positively about the 
vaccine. Moreover, older adults who watched the smiling doctors reported 
increased worry about the flu relative to those who watched the concerned 
doctors. Despite these effects, the complexity of the video stimuli makes it 
 114 
difficult to determine exactly why participants’ evaluations differed across the 
commercial conditions. Further research is needed to explore the possibility that 
feelings toward a target (e.g., a vaccine) are influenced by the congruence 
between the affective and informational components of a message about that 
target. Such research could reveal whether incongruent information results in 
more negative evaluations. Further research with actual behavioral outcomes is 
necessary before it can be considered that concerned rather than happy facial 
expressions accompany health information may be more effective at increasing 
preventative behavior.           
Conclusion 
 Despite the limitations and further questions that arise from the findings of 
the present studies, this research has made small yet informative contributions to 
understanding how facial expressions can influence evaluations and decisions 
related to risky or uncertain prospects. Specifically, Study 1 suggests that fEMG 
may be a useful tool when attempting to evaluate how participants’ affective 
responses to stimuli relate to their risk seeking behavior in financial decision 
tasks. Study 2 suggests that facial expression can have a direct effect on 
participants’ general affective evaluations such as those pertaining to feelings 
rather than more cognitive evaluations of specific attributes (e.g., risks/benefits). 
Furthermore, the findings of Study 2 open the door for future research examining 
whether concerned rather than smiling facial expressions may be differentially 
effective in promoting more positive evaluations of the flu vaccine. More 
generally, it is proposed that future research may benefit from including fEMG 
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measures in order to examine the influence of incidentally presented facial 
expression on evaluations and decisions involving risk. 
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Appendix A 
Affect Grid 
 
 
 133 
Appendix B 
mDES state 
In any given circumstance, people often have a number of different feelings.  Please indicate how 
much of each emotion you feel right now, that is, at the present moment.   
 
 
                          not at all       a little bit     moderately    quite a bit     extremely 
    
   1                   2                   3                  4                  5 
1. amusement  O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
2. hope    O                  O                  O                 O                 O 
3. fear   O                  O                  O                 O                 O 
4. guilt   O                  O                  O                 O                 O 
5. sadness  O                  O                  O                 O                 O 
6. compassion  O                  O                  O                 O                 O 
7. awe    O                  O                  O                 O                 O 
8. anger   O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
9. surprise  O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
10. joy   O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
11. shame  O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
12. contempt  O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
13. love   O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
14. pride  O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
15. contentment  O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
16. embarrassment O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
17. interest  O                  O                  O                 O                 O  
18. disgust  O                  O                  O                 O                 O   
19. gratitude  O                  O                  O                 O                 O 
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Appendix C 
Please answer for the following questions to the best of your ability. 
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1, 000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even? 
Answer: _____________ 
 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What 
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people 
each buy a single BIG BUCKS ticket? 
Answer: _____________ 
 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets in the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a 
car? 
Answer: _____________ 
 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
(mark one) 
 
 ___ 1 in 100 
 ___ 1 in 1000 
 ___ 1 in 10 
 
5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
(mark one) 
    
___ 1% 
___ 10% 
 ___ 5% 
 
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B’s risk is 
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
Answer: _____________ 
 
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B’s risk 
is double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
Answer: _____________ 
 
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get 
the disease? 
A: Out of 100? _________________________   
 
B: Out of 1000? ________________________  
 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a 
____% chance of getting the disease. 
Answer: _____________ 
 
10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how 
many people are expected to get infected? Answer: _____________ 
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Appendix D 
 
Pre-Flu Questionnaire 
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** Questions 1, and 10-15 are asked to older adults only as distraction 
questions.  
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Appendix E 
Post-Commercial Questionnaire 
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Appendix F 
Flu Commercial Script: 
Stay healthy this flu season by getting vaccinated. An annual flu vaccine is the 
best way to reduce your chances of getting and spreading the flu. 
 
The "flu," is a contagious infection that affects the respiratory system. Symptoms 
include fever, cough, sore throat, runny nose, body aches, chills and fatigue. 
 
Remember, the flu can easily be avoided with a simple vaccination that can allow 
you to keep your life on track this flu season.  
 
Influenza is a serious disease that can lead to hospitalization. Even healthy people 
can get very sick from the flu and spread it to their friends, family, and co-
workers.  
 
Protect yourself and your community before the coming flu season. Don’t let the 
flu slow you down! 
  
Side effects of the flu vaccine include Soreness, redness, or swelling at the site of 
the inoculation. A low-grade fever and aches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
